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ABSTRACT
Inkjet printing has proven to be a remarkable disruptive technology. From its humble
beginnings in 1984 it has grown to become the dominant technology for personal computer-based
printing. However, after almost two decades of strong growth, the Inkjet printing market is
maturing. Companies large and small are now beginning to explore use of inkjet in a diverse
range of new applications ranging from manufacture of next generation flat panel displays and
low cost circuits to generation of biochips and fast-prototyping of 3-D objects. These new
applications present existing inkjet players with exciting opportunities to leverage their
knowledge and assets to exploit these new markets.
This thesis explores the opportunities for inkjet technology in two emerging industries: 1)
next-generation flat panel displays based on organic light-emitting diodes and 2) low cost,
disposable circuits required for products such as radio-frequency identification tags and smart
cards. These are likely to be the two biggest opportunities for non-traditional applications of
inkjet technology. In both cases, inkjet provides a flexible, low cost manufacturing method that is
a very compelling alternative to the expensive wafer fab processing required to produce today's
flat panel displays and circuits. Each of these industries is analyzed in considerable depth to
provide context for assessing the disruptive potential of inkjet. The potential of inkjet to become
an important enabling technology is then analyzed using ideas and frameworks from the
management ofteclmology literature.
Both organic LED displays and low cost circuits appear likely to become disruptive
technologies. The best early opportunity for non-traditional application of inkjet technology
appears to be in display manufacturing. Here the technology fit with Inkjet capabilities is good
and the strength of competing manufacturing technologies is relatively weak. Establishment of
inkjet as an important production method for low cost circuits appears more challenging. The
technology fit is not as good and competing low-eost technologies are further along in their
development. It is recommended that existing inkjet players first address the display opportunity
to gain experience with transitioning inkjet from a consumer printing technology to one well-
suited to high-volume electronics manufacturing. Once this capability has been demonstrated the
bigger challenges in circuit manufacturing can be addressed.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry Birdseye Wei!
Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School ofManagement
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1. Inkjet History
The idea of printing with a jet of ink is not new. Many of the physical principles
behind inkjet printing were understood back in the 19th century. In 1878 Lord Rayleigh
studied the breakup of liquid jets into droplets upon application of a small disturbance,
such as pressure wave, to the liquid. [1] See Figure 1. His discovery, however, was
largely forgotten for almost 90 years. It was not until the early 1960s that Richard G.
Fi2ure 1: Drop Breakup from Liquid Jet
~ooooooooo
Ref [1]
Sweet at Stanford hit upon a means to create a practical printer based on Rayleigh's
principles. [2] Sweet discovered that the droplets that formed from a ~ontinuous stream
of fluid emanating from a nozzle could be electrically charged by passing the fluid stream
through an electrode. Further, he found that the charge on each droplet could be
controlled independently. The trajectory ofeach drop could thus be varied by passing the
stream through a uniform electrical. field; the amount of deflection. of each individual
drop depended upon its unique amount of charge.
The electrical field only varies drop trajectory along a vertical axis; however, by
mounting the drop generator on a movable carriage that can scan across the paper
horizontal positioning of the drops can also be achieved. Such an embodiment was
brought to market by the A.B. Dick Company as the world's first inkjet printer.[2] ffiM
followed with their Model 6640 printer, which used a similar drop steering mechanism.
This ffiM printer was capable of printing text characters of typewriter quality.
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These early products are called continuous inkjet printers because they rely on a
steady stream of droplets. Only a small fraction of these drops are needed for printing;
the rest are deflected away from the paper into a gutter where the ink is collected and
recirculated back to a reservoir. " ,.,
Continuous inkjet technology, though elegant, proved too complex to be widely
adopted in computer printers. Instead, this technology found a niche in commercial
labeling where it is widely used today in applications such as printing addresses on
magazines and bulk mail and labeling consumer products with expiration dates, lot
numbers and other data. [3] Continuous inkjet printers for commercial labeling range in
price from $15,000 to above $50,000. [3]
Inkjet technology would require further evolution before it was ready for use in
mainstream computer printing applications. This evolution began with independent and
almost simultaneous discoveries by scientists at Canon and Hewlett-Packard in the late
19708. Legend has it that in 1977 a Canon engineer accidentally touched a syringe of
liquid with his soldering iron and was surprised to see a small amount of liquid ejected
from the syringe as a result. [4] This accident resulted in what was perhaps the first
observation of the phenomenon known as thermal inkjet.
A similar discovery occurred at Hewlett-Packard one year later. In this case an
engineer was testing a metal film by zapping it with electricity. A small amount of liquid
trapped beneath the film began to boil and spurted out. [5] Both companies quickly
recognized that the thermal inkjet phenomenon could become the basis of an important,
new printing technology and began serious, independent efforts to commercialize it
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Thermal inkjet has the significant advantage of being a "drop on demand"
technology; i.e., ink drops are not emitted continuously but iIistead only when needed for
printing. This attribute eliminates the need for additional systems to capture and
recirculate unused ink.
Although Canon had a one year lead in making the initial discovery and
establishing early patents, Hewlett-Packard brought the first thermal inkjet printer to
market in March 1984. [5, 6] Canon introduced their initial "bubblejet" printer a year
later. [7]
lIP's groundbreaking product, called ThinkJet, was priced at $495; it had just 12
nozzles and could print low resolution (96 dpi) text at 150 characters per second. [6, 8]
Although the price sounds high by today's standards, in the mid-1980s printers were very
expensive. Letter quality impact (daisy wheel) and laser printers were in the $2000-$4000
range. [9, 10] Only lower quality dot matrix printers could be purchased for less than a
thousand dollars.
2. Inkjet Disruption
In spite of their attractive low price, these early inkjet printers left much to be
desired. They were slow, had poor print quality and required special paper.[5] Further,
resolution was poor and ink smearing and nozzle clogging were significant problems.
Initial adoption was slow; the inkjet value proposition at that time was not sufficiently
compelling to take much market share away from either laser or impact (dot matrix and
daisy wheel) printers. See Figure 2. Nonetheless, inkjet had two very compelling
secondary attributes, small size and low noise level.
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Compared to impact printers inkjet units were almost silent; also, they were not
much bigger than a typewriter and thus fit easily on a desktop. [11] These secondary
attributes were important to users that were beginning to use personal computers and
word processors and appreciated the convenience of having a printer on the desktop
instead of down the hall in the computer room.
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Hewlett-Packard and Canon continued to improve their inkjet products. The first
color inkjet was introduced in 1987 (HP's PaintJet) and by 1990 both HP and Canon had
introduced plain paper models with performance comparable to dot matrix printers. [12,
13]. As inkjet technology was improving during the 1980s, manufacturers of dot matrix
printers (Seiko Epson, Oki Electronics) paid little heed. Demand for dot matrix printers
was strong and margins were good; they saw no need to make major investments in
"inferior" inkjet technology. Instead they focused engineering effort on improving their
dot matrix products and squeezing more profits out of this maturing technology. [5, 14]
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By 1990 Epson did manage to develop its own drop-cn-demand inkjet technology
based on a piezoelectric rather than a thermal drive mechanism. Piezo-based inkjet
printers were, however, considerably more expensive than competing thermal inkjet
products.
By 1992 inkjet printers offered near-laser quality text and built-in color capability
for about $1000 and sales began to take off. [15] Dot matrix sales fell for the first time in
the face of this disruption. See Figure 2. Inkjet was an inherently simpler and less
expensive technology that had, over time, surpassed the performance possible with dot
matrix technology. The aspects of the dot matrix technology itself made it more
expensive than inkjet and inherently limited resolution.
Dot matrix technology is based on a grid of electromagnetically driven wire
hammers that mark the paper by striking a ribbon. The constant pounding requires
rugged design of the printer chassis and carriage to maintain acceptable tolerances in the
face of considerable vibration loads.[16] Inkjet printing is non-impact and thus allows
for lighter, less costly printer designs. Further, dot matrix resolution is inherently limited
by the spaCing of wire hammers in the printhead grid (3-4 per millimeter). [2] Inkjet
resolution, on the other hand, is limited only by the droplet size itself These limitations
of dot matrix technology could not be overcome by further incremental improvements.
Growth of inkjet printers accelerated throughout the 19905 as the technology
made further improvements in both speed and print quality. By 1999, 68% of all printers
shipped in the U.S. were inkjets. [17] Laser printers accounted for 14% and the once-
dominant impact printers accounted for only 3%.[17] See Figure 3.
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Fi ure 3: 1999 U.S. Printer Shipments
1999 U.S. Printer Shipments (millions)
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From its humble beginnings as an accidental discovery inkjet had become a huge
business. In 2000, the global market for inkjet printers and supplies was $26.6B and is
forecasted to reach $40B by 2005. [18] Revenue from ink supplies alone generated
$12.5B in 2000 and is predicted to reach $22B by 2005. [18] Worldwide market share
of the major competitors in the inkjet printing industry is shown in Figure 4. Hewlett-
Packard is the market share leader; other major players include Epson, Lexmark and
Canon.
Fi ure 4: Worldwide Inkjet Market Share, 1995-2001
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This remarkable growth was fueled by the widespread adoption of personal
computers in homes and small offices. See Figure 5. Customers buying a personal
computer frequently buy a personal printer to go with it; most of the time this printer is
an inkjet. For these customers inkjet offers an unbeatable value proposition of black and
color printing at a low price.
Fi ure 5: Color Inkjet Shipments by Segment, 2000
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Inkjet printing was clearly a disruptive technology in the classic "Innovator's
Dilemma" sense.[20] It initially had poor performance on attributes that the mainstream
market cared about (print quality, speed, smearing) but strong performance on secondary
attributes (noise level, size) of interest to a new class of customers. It was thus largely
ignored by incumbents while the technology gradually improved to meet mainstream
requirements and eventually unseated the mature, incumbent technology.
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3. The Future of Inkjet
Today the inkjet printing industry is itself approaching maturity. The major
competitors have reached parity on most performance attributes of interest to customers
(speed, print quality, etc.) and are now competing chiefly on the basis of price. This
trend toward performance parity is illustrated in Figure 6 for drop size. Decreasing drop
size was important to improving quality of color graphics and photos. Once the drop size
was decreased below the visual threshold (about 5 picoliters), photographic image quality
was realized and there was little reason to further shrink the drops, especially since doing
so adds cost. I The fact that Dell has decided to enter the inkjet printer market is another
sign that the industry is maturing and that inkjet printers are becoming a commodity item.
[21]
Figure 6: Evolution of Drop Size
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I Cost increases with smaller drop size because the number of nozzles and firing rate must be increased to
maintain throughput (ink flux) requiring additional interconnects and electronics.
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Although inkjet technology appears to be reaching the top of the S-curve in
traditional printing applications, there are signs that this technology could become a key
enabling technology in new, emerging industries. Inkjet's incredible ability to precisely
meter picoliter quantities of liquid and place droplets on a substrate with an accuracy ofa
few microns appears to have value that transcends traditional printing applications.
Expanding the notion of what constitutes "ink", opens up a variety of interesting new
possibilities for inkjet. Companies, universities and national labs are investigating use of
inkjet technology in such diverse applications as three-dimensional printing,
biotechnology, and production of electrical, optical and 1v1EMs devices. [22-24] The
interesting question is whether or not inkjet, which proved to be a disruptive technology
for traditional printing, could become a disruptive technology again in a different
industry.
4. Thesis Organization
This thesis explores in some depth two of the most exciting non-traditional
applications of inkjet technology, next-generation displays and low cost electronics. In
the case of displays, inkjet can be used to print organic light-emitting diode (OLED)
materials on flexible or rigid substrates. Displays based on OLEDs appear to have the
best shot at unseating liquid crystal displays (LCDs) as the dominant flat panel
technology for displays both large and small. Inkjet may offer a very low cost means of
manufacturing the displays of the future.
Low cost electronics refers to circuits that can be built on flexible substrates
without use of traditional wafer fab processing. Production of these circuits has more in
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common with printing newspapers then fabricating today's silicon chips. Inkjet
technology can be used to print conducting, insulating, and semiconducting materials
directly on a substrate, thus avoiding the costly lithography and vacuum processing steps
usually required to make chips. Such low cost production methods could enable ultra
cheap, even disposable, circuits for radio-frequency identification (RPID) tags and smart
cards. Such products could revolutionize shopping, inventory management and the way
we use products and services in general. Low cost electronics may also enable more
affordable solar cells, displays and non-volatile storage for digital appliances.
This thesis is organized into five chapters. This chapter is intended to provide
some history and background on inkjet printing to set the stage for discussion of non-
traditional applications of the technology. Chapter 2 consists of a review ofthe relevant
technology management literature related to disruptive technology, technology diffusion
and commercialization of disruptive technologies. Chapter 3 is devoted to inkjet
opportunities in the display industry and Chapter 4 to inkjet opportunities in the low cost
electronics industry. In both cases, a fairly detailed analysis of the industry and
incumbent technologies is presented in order to provide context for analysis of
opportunities for inkjet. Chapter 5 compares the inkjet opportunities in the two industries
and assesses whether or not these opportunities are disruptive. Investment
recommendations for existing inkjet players are also presented.
This chapter concludes with a short technical discussion of the two major types of
drop-on-demand inkjet technology, thermal and piezoelectric. These technologies are
mentioned frequently in later chapters and it is important to have a basic understanding of
what they are and how they work
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5. Inkjet Technical Background
Thermal inkjet is one of two types of drop-on-demand inkjet technology. Unlike
continuous inkjet which requires a steady stream of droplets to be flowing at all times,
drop-on-demand inkjet only ejects a drop when required for printing. There are no
unneeded drops to collect and recycle. Thermal inkjet uses a tiny thin film resistor
located within each nozzle to boil a thin film of ink. A narrow voltage pulse heats the
resistor to above 300C in a few microseconds producing a vapor bubble in the ink.[25]
The bubble expands and drives a droplet of ink out of the nozzle. As the bubble collapse
it draws fresh ink into the nozzle firing chamber for the next shot. [26] There are no
moving parts other than the ink itself. Drop firing frequencies as high as 18 kHz are
possible with this approach. [8] See Figure 7. It is important to note that only a very
small amount of liquid is boiled and that !he temperature of the ejected drop itself is in
equilibrium with the printhead (typically 40-60C) and is not particularly hot. With the
exception of Epson, all the major inkjet competitors (HP, Canon, and Lexmark) use
thermal inkjet technology in their products.
'" ink droplet
~
Ior
"~*,(••r~"'."
vapor bubble
ams and Photo
orifice plate
,/
thin film resistorthin film conductor
ink channel
Ref. [8]
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Epson's inkjet products are based on piezoelectric inkjet technology. Piezo inkjet
differs from thermal inkjet in that a vibration plate connected to a vibrating piezoelectric
crystal provides the energy for drop ejection. When the piezo crystal pushes the plate
fluid is displaced and a droplet is forced out of the nozzle. When the crystal pulls on the
plate, fresh ink is drawn into the fIring chamber. [26] See Figure 8.
Thermal and piezo inkjet have different strengths and weaknesses. Thermal inkjet
is less expensive to manufacture and supports higher nozzle densities. Designs with 600
nozzles per inch have already been commercialized.[8] The primary drawback with
thermal inkjet is that the range of jettable liquids is limited to those that will boil on the
thin film resistor and are not degraded by thermal heating. To date, thermal inkjet has
been used chiefly to print aqueous fluids.
Fi ure 8: Piezoelectric Inkjet Diagram
laminated
/' metal plates
ink
channel
diaphragm
piezoelectric
transducer
Ref. [8]
ink
droplet
deflected
diaphragm
Since piezo uses a purely mechanical approach to eject drops it has fewer
limitations on the type of fluids which can be jetted. [24] For this reason, most non-
traditional inkjet applications to date have used piezo technology. Another piezo
advantage is that is possible to achieve variable drop size within a nozzle by varying the
amount of deflection of the vibration plate. [27] Drawbacks to piezo include higher cost
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and lower nozzle densities; both of these disadvantages are related to mechanical
manufacturing processes which make miniaturization more difficult.
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1. Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, demand mode inkjet printing has proven to be an
important disruptive technology. Inkjet's unique ability to deliver minute quantities of a
fluid to a substrate with very high spatial accuracy was critical to its success in printing
applications and could prove to be important in other industries such as displays, low cost
electronics and biotechnology_ Whether or not inkjet can successfully move
"horizontally" into other industries depends not only upon addressing key technical
challenges but also upon technology management issues related to disruptive technology,
technology diffusion and commercialization.of new technologies. This chapter explores
the important literature in these areas to provide context for discussion in later chapters of
whether it makes sense to deploy inkjet technology in other industries and, if so, how best
to go about it.
2. Disruptive Technology
2" 1 Types of Technological Innovation
Clay Christensen has written extensively on the topic of disruptive technologies
and their implications. [1-8] This body of work is based on a framework originally
discussed in his book The Innovator 's Dilemma.
Christensen defines two major types of technology innovation: sustaining
technology and disruptive technology. Sustaining technology consists of incremental
improvements to an existing technology_ These improvements are geared towards
delivering products with better performance along established dimensions to be sold to
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existing customers for higher margins. Disruptive technologies, on the other hand, are
revolutionary and may initially offer neither better performance nor better margins.
Christensen suggests that disruptive technologies require a different value
network or system of use than the sustaining technologies that they may displace. [9]. A
value network is a system of producers and markets to which a given innovation
contributes. If a new innovation does not have value within an existing value network or
system of use it is difficult for incumbents to be successful. The value network can be
thought of as a nested hierarchy of product architectures. Figure 1 shows how inkjet
printers and supplies fit into the value network for personal computer peripherals.
A firm must have competencies in each of the areas in the value network in order
to be successful. Tushman and Anderson suggest that innovations that enhance existing
competencies are typically initiated by incumbents and are sustaining innovations. [10]
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Conversely, innovations that destroy or othenvise do not make use of existing
competencies are typically initiated by new entrants and are disruptive innovations.
The development of non~impact printing technologies is consistent with these
ideas. For example, the value network and related competencies for firms making dot
matrix printers (e.g, Centronics, Okidata) is certainly very different from that in Figure 1;
these firms were not the leaders in introducing non-impact technologies such as inkjet
and laser printing.
Henderson and Clark take the idea of competence enhancing or destroying
innovations and add to it the concept of linkages between core concepts and components
to create a typology ofinnovation.[11] See Figure 2.
Figure 2: Typology of Innovation
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The incremental and radical innovations are familiar from previous work but this
typology introduces two new types of innovation, modular and architectural. Modular
innovations involve new technology but don't significantly impact the relationship
among key components. An example here would be the transition from analog to digital
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cell phones. Architectural innovation, meanwhile, occurs when the innovation reinforces
core concepts but changes the linkages among components. Competitor's architectural
innovation can spell trouble for existing firms by appearing like straightforward evolution
of existing designs, thus drawing no response. Subtle but important changes in the
relationships between key components are often not immediately recognized until the
firm is at a significant disadvantage.
An example of architectural innovation is the jet engine and its impact on the
airframe industry. Jet engines did not merely displace propellers as a propulsion system
but changed the relationship between the engine and airframe in important ways.
Henderson and Clark point to examples of architectural innovation that occurred in the
evolution of photolithographic equipment for the semiconductor industry. Here
successive generations of equipment involved architectural innovations that led to
changes in industry leadership. Many of the disruptive innovations in the disk drive
industry that are discussed by Christensen are also architectural and not radical
innovations. [6] In general, existing firms are able to successfully adopt and
commercialize incremental and modular innovations, where linkages among important
components are unchanged. They are much less successful with architectural and radical
innovations; these are disruptive innovations which do not align well with a firm) s
organization and capabilities.
Fafii and Kampas have developed a practical tool for assessing a potentially
disruptive technology.[12] This framework, which is intended to help incumbent firms
assess competitive threats from new entrants, breaks the disruption process into six stages
and identifies key factors at each stage. These six stages are foothold market entry, main
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market entry, customer attraction, customer switching, incumbent retaliation, and finally,
incumbent displacement. At each stage key factors are identified and rated according to
the extent to which they disable or enable disruption and a weighted score is determined
for each stage. The result is a pseudo-quantitative disruptiveness profile that provides a
very nice summary of the potential for disruption to occur. The Fafii and Kampas
framework builds upon and extends the ideas of Christensen and others to provide a
useful tool that managers can use. The six stages to get to incumbent displacement make
it clear that the path to success for a disruptive technology is not an easy one_ Disruption
can be disabled at any stage, leaving the incumbent firm at the helm.
2.2 Patterns of Disruption
Christensen suggests that disruptive technologies often follow an "attack from
below" trajectory into a market [6] The disruptive technology often has lower
performance on a primary attribute but better performance on one or more ancillary
attributes. As such, the disruptive technology is initially only attractive to a niche market
that values the performance of the disruptive technology on an ancillary attribute and is
over-served by the dominant technology on the primary performance attribute. Firms
with the dominant technology, meanwhile, continue to listen to their best customers and
focus on incremental performance improvements to primary product attributes. The
niche market served by the disruptive technology does not appear attractive or important
to the firms with the dominant technology_
Often these dominant firms improve performance at a higher rate than the market
can absorb. Although customers may welcome these improvements, they are typically
unwilling to pay a premium for them and their attention shifts to value provided along
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other dimensions of performance, such as those provided by the disruptive technology.
Meanwhile the baseline performance of the disruptive technology improves over time
until it meets the needs of a larger and larger share of customers. The former dominant
firms are thus unseated by new entrants. See Figure 3.
Christensen's "attack from below" paradigm is compelling and seems to fit well
with disruptive innovations in the disk drive industry. Not all disruptive innovations,
however, fit Christensen's model. An expanded view of disruptive technologies is
offered by Acee.[13]
Fi ure 3: Disru tive Technolo Model
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Acee looks at a number of innovations in terms of their cost, traditional
performance, and ancillary performance and finds a number that do not follow the
Christensen dogma of lower cost, lower traditional performance and higher ancillary
performance. See Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Disruptive Innovations
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This expanded framework is very relevant for thinking about the ability of inkjet
technology to "invade" other industries. For example, inkjet technology can be used to
print circuits using a direct-write approach. Here traditional perfonnance (circuit density
and complexity) is currently far less than that possible with traditional silicon technology
but there are significant ancillary benefits such as design flexibility, lower cost and the
lack of need for photomasks and a wafer fab to generate the circuits.
2.3 Disruptive Technology and Industry Structure
Christensen has recently extended his framework to include the effect of
disruptive technologies on industry structure. [4, 14] The idea here is that important
ancillary attributes of the disruptive technology are often ease of use, product variety,
ease of customization, and speed to market These factors favor modular rather than
integrated product architectures. Once basic product perfonnance is good enough,
independent companies will emerge which specialize in producing the various modular
components. These companies work with other non-integrated firms that design and
assemble end-use systems. This arrangement provides important advantages over
2 OSB stands for oriented strand board.
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integrated firms in speed, cost, and flexibility. The end result is that the disruptive
technology can lead to disintegration of industry structure. The disintegration is
accelerated by the development of industry standards for the components. Such
disintegration has happened in the personal computer industry. [15] See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Computer Industry Structure
Computer Industry Structure, 1975-85
IBM DEC BUNCH
Microprocessors
Operating Systems » » »
-
Peripherals ""U
""U "1J"""'l
0 """'l aApplications Software a. 0
c C- o.
n c CNetwork Services
-
n C)(J)
-
r-+
en en
Assembled Hardware
(A. Grove, Intel; and Farrell, Hunter & Saloner, Stanford)
Computer Industry Structure, 1985-95
Microprocessors I Intel IMoto I AMD letcI
Operating Systems I Microsoft IMac ~
Peripherals I HP I Epson ISeagate I etc ~I
Applications Software I Microsoft I Lotus I Novell G!Q]
Network Services IAOUNetscape IMicrosoft IEDS ktCl
Assembled Hardware IHP I Compaq I IBM I Dell ~tc I
(A. Grove, Intel; and Farrell, Hunter & Saloner, Stanford)
Ref[15]
Such disintegration has not yet happened to a significant extent in the inkjet
printer industry. The inkjet supplies business is an attractive target given the huge
profits that it generates. [16] However, strong patent protection and the large capital
investments required to manufacture inkjet cartridges have prevented disintermediation
by smaller firms. Further, there is no industry standard for the electrical and mechanical
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interface between the inkjet cartridge and the printer. There are smaller firms that offer
inkjet refill kits and remanufactured cartridges but they have yet to take significant
business away from original manufacturers. Third parties are, however, making
significant inroads into the laser printer toner supplies business and the inkjet supplies
business may eventually become similarly vulnerable to disintegration. Future
applications of inkjet technology, such as printing of circuits, may work well in a
modular architecture where firms with inkjet printing expertise could deliver part of the
circuit manufacturing process without controlling the entire value chain.
Utterback has also done important work on the topic of disruptive technology and
industry structure. [17] He introduces the concept of a dominant desigl\ which is the
design that is most strongly preferred in the marketplace. The dominant design is not
predetermined but rather results from. th~, <;9rnplex interaction of technical and market
choices. A firm's strategy, collateral assets (brand, channels, etc.), government policy,
and communication with customers can all playa role in determining what design
becomes dominant. The dominant d~sign plays an importantrole in industry structure.
Prior to emergence of a dominant. design there is a fluid phase with a large
number of firms attempting to commercialize a variety of designs. Once a dominant
design emerges a transitional phase begins where the number of firms exiting the
industry, either through consolidation or failure, accelerates. In the transitional phase,
surviving firms focus increasingly on process improvements since dominant product
design has been determined. Finally, there is a specific phase as the industry matures.
Here there the number of firms stabilizes at a low level with only the largest, most
efficient firms surviving. See Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Dominant Design
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For example, in the U.S. automobile industry prior to 1920 there were as many as
70 different firms making cars. In the mid-1920s a dominant design emerged based on
the internal combustion engineer and an all-steel enclosed body. The number of firms
fell sharply in the following decade and then continued to decrease to the familiar Big
Three. The auto industry has clearly reached the specific phase. Utterback argues that, in
spite of the importance ofclominant design in governing industry structure, its existence
can be determined only in retrospect, not in the heat of the battle.
2.4 Innovation in Nonassembled Products
Utterback's work on the dynamics of innovation extends to innovation in
nonassembled, or process-intensive, products. [17] Utterback defines nonassembled
products to be physical goods, such as glass or steel, which have few discrete
components.3 Nonassembled goods tend to be process intensive and, as a result, the rate
3 Utterback's framework is limited to physical goods and does not scale to purely digital products such as
software and web services.
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of process innovations quickly outstrips the rate of product innovations once a dominant
design has emerged. With appearance of a dominant design the basic functionality of the
product (e.g., glass, steel) can remain unchanged for long periods of time; firms focus
instead on process innovations to improve product performance and reduce cost.
This work is directly relevant to future uses of inkjet technology since inkjet may
become an enabling process technology to create displays or circuits. [17] Strictly
speaking, displays and circuits are not nonassembled products like glass or steel but they
share many of their important characteristics in that they consist of a relatively small
number of discrete components and most of the cost of production is related to the
process itself rather than to the cost of input components. Once a dominant design has
emerged for displays or low cost electronics, inkjet technology would be among
competing process innovations to create these products most efficiently_
Utterback finds that nonassembled or process-intensive products differ from
assembled products in that process innovations can <:;Qntribute to much larger cost
reductions than for assembled products. For. assembled products, the cost of the
assembly process is relatively small relative tQ the components; process improvements
here thus lead to only incremental cost reductions. Nonassembled products typically
show discontinuous decreases in unit cost over time. ,There are s~arp drops in unit cost
when new process architectures are introduced. followed by gradual decreases due to
incremental process innovations. Although process innovations can offer significant cost
reductions, they typically have high introduction costs. Implementing a new process
innovation, such as float glass, often involves replacement of major pieces of capital
equipment and can even require construction of entire new factories.
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Utterback's work is quite relevant for evaluating the potential of inkjet as a
manufacturing technology. Implementation of inkjet for patterning of circuits or display
materials would be a significant change in process architecture and could potentially offer
huge cost savings. A switch to inkjet based process tools would also involve significant
new capital investment in order to realize the process cost savings.
3. Technology Diffusion
The literature reviewed so far has clarified how disruptive technologies differ
from sustaining technologies, explained types of disruptive technology and how they can
affect industry structure, and revealed how innovation in process-intensive products
differs from that for assembled products. The next important issue to investigate is
diffusion of new disruptive technologies. That is, once a promising disruptive technology
has emerged, how quickly will it be adopted? Rate of adoption of new technologies is
important not only for the companies offering and adopting them but for economic and
productivity growth in general. "
There is a large and rich body of literature 'on the topic of diffusion of innovations
that dates back to the work of Tarde in 1903.[18] Tarde is credited with developing a
number of pioneering ideas that have been tested and developed by later diffusion
researchers. Among them is the idea that adoption of new ideas follows an S-Curve.
Rogers' Diffusion ofInnovations is among the first comprehensive books written
on the topic. [19] Rogers reviews over 500 diffusion studies and attempts to find
common threads. His work covers diffusion research in a variety of diverse areas
including anthropology, sociology, education, and industry. The work focused on
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diffusion of technologies in industry is of the greatest interest for this review but many
aspects of the diffusion of ideas are common to all fields and are worth discussing.
Diffusion research across many fields reveals that adoption of new ideas, no
matter how compelling, does not happen instantly, but instead follows an S-curve with
slow adoption at first, followed by a period of rapid adoption and finally a gradually
slowing of adoption rate as the potential market for the idea becomes saturated. [20] The
time lag before an adoption reaches wide acceptance can be quite long; for example the
tunnel kiln required 40 years to attain wide spread use in the pottery industry and hybrid
seed com took 14 years to achieve wide acceptance among farmers in Iowa. [19]
Rogers' identifies several stages leading to the adoption of a new idea. The first
stage is awareness of the idea; initial awareness is often accidental but can become a
driver of need. Awareness is followed by interest, which is characterized by deliberate
seeking of more information on the idea. The next stage is evaluation, which is focused
on weighing the costs and benefits of the idea and deciding whether to give the idea a try.
Evaluation is logically followed by trial, and then, finally, by adoption. Note that
rejection ofthe idea can occur at any of these stages, even after adoption if the innovation
doesn't work out or otherwise live up to its original promise.
Sources of information are very important for the both the awareness and
evaluation stages. Mass media is the most effective means of generating awareness, but
for the evaluation stage personal communication is more important. Once the trial stage
is reached, information obtained from personal experience with the innovation is what
matters most. Of course, the characteristics of the innovation itself are of paramount
importance.
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Innovation characteristics that-result in' faste~ diffusion induCle 'refative advantage
(including contribution to profitability),' compatibility, complexity,divTsihility,· and
communicability. [19] Compatibility refers to compatibility with existing processes.
Divisibility refers to the ability t6 try out the idea·on a limited basis. Communicability is
the ease with which the idea and its benefits can be described to others.
3.1 Adopter Categories
Rogers' important work In finding common threads in the wide variety of
diffusion research extends to development of the adopter category framework.[19, 21]
This conceptual framework suggests that the distribution of adopters is normal and that
this bell-curve can be divided into five types of adopters, each with unique characteristics
(See Figure 8).
Innovators are the first to adopt and are typically venturesome, curious risk-takers
with the financial means to absorb a loss if the new idea doesn't succeed. Early adopters
come next; they are less aggressive than innovators but appreciate the benefits of
innovations and are comfortable adopting without well-established references. Early
adopters are followed by the early majority. Early majority adopters are practical and
prefer well-established references before adopting. Late majority adopters are similar to
the early majority but are more skeptical and apt to wait until they feel they must adopt.
The laggards make up the tail end of the adopter distribution. Laggards are tradition-
focused and don't like new technology; they adopt last, if at all. The adopter categories
are chiefly used for studying the adoption of products or ideas by individual consumers,
but they have also been employed in trying to empirically determine characteristics of
individual firms related to innovativeness.
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Figure 8: Adopter Categories
Technology Adoption Life Cycle
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Geoffrey Moore, in his popular management book, Crossing the Chasm, expands
upon Rogers' idea of adopter categories. [22] Moore adds to the framework, which he
calls the Technology Adoption Lifecycle, a "chasm" or gap between early adopters and
the early majority. He claims that the success of a new product or innovation depends
upon achieving adoption among the early majority group. Moore suggests that driving
adoption into the innovator and early majority categories is relatively easy; these small
groups are willing to try almost any new technology product. The challenge comes in
selling the product to the early majority, where there is a difficult chicken-and-egg
problem. The early majority requires well-established references from people like them
before they will buy.
Moore extends the adopter category framework into a marketing model for high
tech products. He suggests that the marketing plan follow the technology adoption
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lifecycle from left to right. Moore's marketing strategy, although aimed at high tech
products, also has relevance for driving adoption of new process technologies,
particularly in vertical disintegrated industries; i.e., where a firm is attempting to license
its process or sell a tool which embodies its process rather than using the process
internally to create a product.
Moore's strategy calls for a D-Day approach to cross the chasm. This approach
involves sharp focus on a niche market where plenty of support and service can be
lavished upon early customers. The niche market provides a cluster of customers in one
area who can serve as credible references for other, similar customers. The niche market
also provides a well-defined target customer for whom the initial product offering can be
optimized. Once a niche market has been identified, a compelling reason to buy must be
established for customers. Moore suggests that this compelling reason should be a
radical improvement in productivity in a well-understood area. This value proposition is
the one most likely to convince those in the pragmatic early majority to adopt.
The early majority evaluate "whole products", not just hardware or software.
This means that the product must include all service, support and accessories required to
deliver on the full value proposition of the product. The early majority also prefer
competition; competition allows them to comparison shop and is the sign of a safe,
mature market. This expectation requires that the firm marketing the innovation define a
market for the product in such a way that the compelling reason to buy can be clearly
communicated. Market, not product-based, values are what matter to the mainstream
early majority. Finally, Moore recommends a direct sales force to stimulate demand and
market-leader, not bargain, pricing.
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The work of Rogers and Moore is focused chiefly on adoption of innovations by
individuals; some of these ideas seem inappropriate for firms adopting new processes.
For example, adopter categories for ftrms are probably different than those suggested by
Rogers. Economic forces should eliminate late majority and laggard firms who fail to
adopt important innovations until most all the other firms in their industry have done so.
Firms also require less "hand holding" than Moore suggests to cross the chasm. Firms
have considerable resources and should be willing to adopt promising innovations before
they are offered as a complete "tum key" solution by the vendor. Nonetheless, the work
of Rogers and Moore provide a good background for understanding diffusion of
innovations. Fortunately there is a sizable body of work focused specifically upon the
diffusion of industrial process innovations.
3.2 Diffusion of Process Innovations
Much of the historical work in this area is summarized in two important books:
Davies' The DiffuSion ofProcess Innovations, which examines the diffusion of 22 post-
war process innovations in the U.K., and Nasbeth and Ray's The DiffuSion of New
Industrial Processes, which includes case studies of ten innovations in six European
countries. [23, 24] A recent summary of work in the field is provided by Baptista. [25]
From this work it is clear that different innovations in different industries vary in their
diffusion patterns. Although generalization is difficult, there are some important
common themes and frameworks.·
For example, one common characteristic of process innovations, and of
innovations in general for that matter, is that they are often not entirely new concepts but
can instead result from the aggregation of a number of existing ideas. Their invention
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and development is frequently accomplished by firms or individuals outside the industry.
The view of a firm inventing a process for its own use, patenting it and then licensing to
others is largely inaccurate. This characteristic is consistent with Utterback's
observations of technological product innovations. [17] A second common theme to keep
in mind is that most new process and product innovations are not widely adopted
(diffused) and fail. The S-curve does not characterize the path of all innovations, only
the successful ones_ Rejection can and often does occur at any of the stages between
awareness and adoption.
This literature indicates that there are three principal stages in the development of
new process innovations. The first is the research and development leading to the
invention and initial prototype. Next is the work required to tum the original invention
into an innovation or commercial offering. The last stage is the inter-firm and intra-firm
diffusion of the innovation. The overall speed of technical advancements is related
directly to pace and level of activity at each of these three stages; overall the most
important factor is the speed of diffusion.
3.3 Diffusion Models
The importance of speed of diffusion has led to much research in the area of
diffusion models, which attempt to explain adoption S-curves and identify key factors
which effect adoption rates. A recent article by Gerosk.i provides an excellent summary
of these efforts. [26] The most commonly found model used to explain technology
diffusion is the so-called epidemic model. The central tenet of this· model is that
.',..,
technology diffusion is gated chiefly by the spread of knowledge about the innovation;
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i.e., some firms simply learn about an innovation later than others. Epidemic models are
inherently aggregate models that attempt to explain the number of adopters of a new
technology over time. They are most useful for identifying factors that explain
differences in adoption rates among firms or among countries. As its name implies,
epidemic models leverage theories developed to explain the spread of disease. Epidemic
models assume that a potential user will adopt an innovation upon learning of its
existence and that word of the innovation is spread by direct contact between a user that
has already adopted an innovation and a potential new user. The rate at which
"uninfected" non-users adopt in a given period is thus related to the proportion ofusers in
the industry population that have already adopted and the number of non-users yet to
adopt. The resulting equation for adoption rate is
m(t) = [1 + exp(-a _ j3 *t ]-1
n
where m(t) is the number of firms adopting at time t, n is the total number of firms in the
industry, p is the parameter governing speed of diffusion, and a is a constant of
integration. This simple model predicts the S-curve or logistic curve frequently observed
in experimental measurements of diffusion; this curve can be fit to experimental data to
determine p; regression analysis can then be used to investigate which exogenous factors
(e.g., firm size, profitability) are correlated to p. See Figure 9 for examples of curves
from this model for slow and fast diffusion.
Although epidemic models have yielded some useful insights, they have been
criticized on a number of fronts. The fundamental weakness of epidemic models is the
assumption that adoption is driven entirely by the availability of information about the
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technology. In fact, technology adoption takes much longer than the time required for
information about the technology to spread.
The epidemic model also regards users as a homogenous group of passive
information recipients, rather than active information seekers and decision makers.
Changes over time in the technology and its profitability for the firm are also ignored.
To address these shortcomings of epidemic models, another theoretical approach,
called a probit model, has been developed which focuses on the time of adoption of new
technology by individual firms. Unlike aggregate epidemic models, probit models are
disaggregate in that the analysis is based on individual adoption decisions. Probit
models assume that firms are heterogeneous and differ in some characteristic Xi, which
affects their profitability of adopting a new technology. Firms will adopt a new
technology when Xi exceeds some threshold value x"'(t), which decreases over time.
Values of X are distributed across the population of firms by some function f(x). The
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shape of the diffusion curve with probit models thus depends upon f(x) and x*(t). Iff(x)
is a bell curve then decrease ofx*(t) at a constant rate will generate an S-curve. Iff(x) is
a uniform (rectangular) distribution then x*(t) must vary over time in order to produce an
S-curve. See Figure 10.
Over the years researchers have used probit models to identify a number of
interesting firm characteristics (xi's) that influence technology adoption decisions.
Important factors are discussed in the following section.
Figure 10: Probit Models
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3.4 Factors Influencing Technology Adoption by Firms
The decision of a firm to adopt a new process technology depends upon three
categories ofvariables. [24]
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• Innovation variables: variables related to the innovation's technical
applicability and relative advantage (profitability).
• Company variables: financial resources of firm, size and structure of
firm, firm culture, management attitudes towards new techniques.
• Environmental variables: variables related to firm's operating
environment (network effects, suppliers, geography, networking).
The cost of adopting a new technology is obviously a key factor governing its
relative advantage. One important cost is the vintage, or age, of existing capital
equipment purchased to implement the old technology. Firms with older, fully
depreciated capital equipment are more likely to switch to a new technology than firms
with more recent capital investments in the old technology. Another influential cost is
that of switching to the new technology. These switching costs include not only new
capital investment but downstream costs related to adopting the new technology
(marketing, developing new products based on the technology, etc.).
A very important switching cost is related to the firm's ability to learn. Firms
with a strong learning culture will be able to understand and fully utilize the new
technology much faster than other firms and will thus incur lower learning-related
switching costs. Woiceshyn discusses the importance of organizational learning for
technology adoption in the oil industry. [27] Costs of learning about the innovation prior
to adoption are also important. Firms with lower learning and search costs will tend to
adopt an innovation sooner. Environmental factors such as networking opportunities and
geography effects provide important means of lowering these costs. Networking
between potential adopters and adopters provides an important means of reducing risk
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and uncertainty and speeding diffusion. These networking opportunities are most
prevalent if the firms in a particular industry are clustered in a particular geographic area.
Regional networking effects among firms may help explain rapid diffusion of
biotech innovations in the Boston area and of computer-related innovations in Silicon
Valley. Networking between firms and universities can also contribute to reduced
learning costs and faster technology diffusion.
It is not just technical knowledge which enjoys faster diffusion in geographic
clusters of high tech firms but also marketing-related knowledge. For example, recent
research shows that geographically clustered software firms introduce fewer products for
their R&D investments but have higher sales per employee than isolated firms. [28] This
research suggests that this difference is related to shared knowledge about customers and
markets rather than diffusion of new technological innovations. Although the clustered
firms introduce fewer products, these products are better tailored to customer needs and
thus sell better, on average, than products developed by geographically isolated firms.
.A commonly explored company variable is firm size. The bulk of experimental
evidence suggests that larger firms adopt innovations earlier than smaller firms. The
primary explanations offered to explain this outcome are that scale economies can make
adoption more attractive for larger firms and that larger firms have greater financial
resources and are thus better positioned to absorb the loss should the innovation fail.
Large firms are also more likely to have technical staffcapable ofearly evaluation of new
process innovations.
Thomas, however, points out that this tendency for larger firms to adopt an
innovation earlier than smaller firms only holds true only if the innovation does not
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rapidly obsolete existing technologies and products.[29] In cases where the innovation is
disruptive and does obsolete existing products, then smaller firms tend to 'adopt earlier.
This is consistent with the work of Clll-istensen (previously dted) and Utterback. [17]
Another important company variable governing technology adoption is the firm's
expectations about the technology. Strong expe'ctations regarding the innovation's ability
to boost profits will hasten adoption. On the other hand, if the firm expects either the old
or the new technology to improve in the near future, diffusion of the new technology will
be slowed.
A crucial environmental factor that drives diffusion of new technologies is
network effects; a good discussion of network effects can by found in Information Rules
by Shapiro and Varian.[30] Network effects occur when the value of an innovationio a
firm or individual is related to how many others have adopted the innovation. Network
effects can result in either positive or negative reinforcing effects and can either
dramatically accelerate or inhibit spread of innovations.
For example, positive feedback network effects played a major role in the
ascendancy of Wintel~basedpersonal computers. As the installed base grew there was
more software available, more users with whom to share files and more resources for
service and support. The growing installed base also resulted in reduced costs due to
competition and scale economies. These factors drove further adoption which further
increased the installed base thus creating a virtuous cycle..'Conversely, .Apple .suffered
from negative reinforcing network effects as more and more people bought Wintel
machines. The vicious cycle of fewer users, less software, higher costs leading to fewer
users has hurt Apple's market share.
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Network effects have also helped Hewlett-Packard maintain its strong market
share in inkjet printers. HP's large installed base leads existing retailers to devote more
shelf space to lIP's products and encourages new retailers to carry lIP's printers and
supplies. The wide availability ofHP inkjet printers and supplies leads to increased sales
and higher supply usage, which, in turn, provides money for lIP to create more new
products, thus further increasing the installed base. These network effects would make it
difficult for a new entrant into the inkjet printing market. Lack of installed base would
make it hard for new users to find printers and supplies thus hurting sales and depriving
the new entrant of revenue needed. to grow the business. Dell, a new entrant to the inkjet
printer market, is attempting to overcome the powerful retailer network effects by selling
printers and supplies through their well-established web channel. [31] This model
depends on the risky assumption that customers will be willing to plan ahead and bQY
supplies on-line rather than running to the store when their cartridge runs dry.
Another important environmental factor influ~J:l(;ing adoption is the suppliers of
the new technology. They play a pivotal role in educating firms about the new
technology; further, their pricing, service and support are important for driving adoption
once awareness ha,s 1:>een~sta1Jlishecl~ ~uppliers are key players in the battle between the
old and the new technologies. While suppliers of the new .technology will aggressively
push their innovation, suppliers of the old technology often respond by making
incremental, yet significant, improvements of their own. Such incremental
improvements to the old technology can clearly slow the diffusion of the new one. This
"sailing ship" effect is well known .and. is. dis~\lssed by Utterback in the context of the
development of the electric light bulb and machine-made ice.[17]
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This section has explo'red diffusion ~f innovations and, in particular, the key
factors that drive adoption of new technology by firms. However, these firms can only
easily adopt the new technology if it is successfully commercialized. The next and last
.- ' \ ~~,/>< L'.l,~,~.( <,.~-:.}~~t~~~,,~ ;r.:,. " " I' ,';' ":,,; ~. J ~':;' ..~,".',.
section of this chapter discusses the challenges and strategies related to commercializing
innovations.
4. Commercialization
4. 1 Challenges Faced by Incumbents
So far this review has focused on characteristics of disruptive technologies and
important factors which influence their diffusion. A related topic which demands
attention is the question of how can incumbent firms, particularly larger ones,
successfully commercialize disruptive technologies that are not aligned with their core
business. This topic is highly relevant for establishing inkjet as an enabling technology
in areas other than traditional printing. The major inkjet firms such as lIP, Epson and
Canon, are large companies that have the knowledge and resources to explore oon-
traditional applications of inkjet technology but must do so without negatively impacting
the highly profitable core business. The challenges that established firms face in trying to
exploit disruptive technologies have been explored by a number of researchers.
Ironically, it seems that the good management practices that helped grow and nurture the
core business often cripple efforts to successfully create new businesses.
These good management practices that evolve to support the core business result
in what Sull calls "active inertia" where organizations follow established patterns of
behavior that worked in the past but are often inappropriate as markets evolve and new
technologies emerge.[32] Firms that cannot make strategic adjustments to change and
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persist in approaches that brought initial success often fail. Sull describes a dynamic of
failure in which firms become locked into old strategic frames or assumptions about what
is and is not important. The old frames become blinders which prevent the necessary
adjustments to maintain competitiveness. Processes become hard-to-change routines~
values become dogma and relationships become shackles. Polariod and Firestone are
among the once-great companies that were unable to escape this dynamic of failure and
are no operating as independent businesses.
Christensen views this problem in terms of organizational capabilities that exist
independent of the people and other resources in the firm. [6, 7] These organizational
capabilities evolved to support the company's core business and are often not well-suited
to commercialization of a disruptive technology. These organizational capabilities lie in
three key areas: resources, processes and values. The capabilities migrate over time as
frrms grow. Startups and small firms are chiefly dependent upon resources, chiefly
people and physical assets. While the firm is small, the founders and management team
know all the employees and have first-hand knowledge of what is going on throughout
the firm. As the firm grows, managers cannot personally stay abreast of all that is going
on and processes must be developed to insure consistent performance ofkey tasks. These
processes create the ability to do one set of tasks well but at the same time define
disability in doing other tasks. These essential processes are the beginning of Sull' s
active inertia.
For example, a large inkjet company may have a rigorous process of market
research and financial analysis to determine market size and opportunity before launching
a new printer. This work can be done with considerable accuracy since the company
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knows the market and the technology very well. Only the most promising opportunities
are pursued and the expectations for success are high. This logical approach, which
makes perfect sense for the core printing business, is not a good process for disruptive
teclmologies. The markets for disruptive technologies often do not ex.ist and thus cannot
be rigorously analyzed. Further, chances for failure are high and expectations for a high
success rate are unrealistic.
As a firm grows larger still values and culture become important. These values
are a way of behaving that penneate a company and allow employees throughout the
organization to make the right decisions in support of the core business. These values
are, in essence, the DNA of large firms; they insure consistent firm performance even in
the face of rapid growth and employee turnover. Persistent values in large organizations
often include expectations for gross margins, the size of business opportunities, and
acceptable failure rate, which are not consistent with most new businesses based on
disruptive technologies.
Such new businesses typically offer (at least initially) low margins 1n small
emerging markets where success is far from certain. Successful commercialization of
disruptive technologies requires a culture that expects, accepts and even honors failure as
a necessary part of exploring new markets, not a culture that only pursues low risk
opportunities with near certain payoffs. This new culture should encourage a strategy of
failing cheaply and often, rather than placing a few big bets. Without such a culture, the
most talented people will avoid involvement in risky new business since· the stigma of
failure (which is likely) will damage their career prospects.
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Leonard-Barton offers the theory of core rigidities to explain the challenges
existing firms face in successfully commercializing disruptive technology.[33] She
defines core rigidities as the values, skills, and managerial and technical systems that
once served a firm well but are no longer appropriate. Her core rigidities are thus related
to the resources, processes and values in Christensen's framework. A new idea in the
core rigidity theory is that of dominant and nondominant disciplines. In engineering-
driven firms, R&D is often the dominant discipline. The dominant discipline has high
status, attracts the best talent, and tends to have strong influence in making strategic
decisions. Nondominant disciplines such as marketing and manufacturing, have lower
status and thus more difficulty in attracting top people. Members of nondominant
disciplines typically have less input into major business decisions than members of the
dominant discipline. The dynamics here are that of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The
nondominant disciplines have smaller, less capable staffs which in turn reinforces their
low status image and low strategic influence. Weakness in nondominant disciplines can
become a particular problem when trying to launch new ventures where strong cross-
functional participation and integration is important for success.
4.2 Organizational Strategies
The different processes and values needed for success in bringing disruptive
technologies to markets clearly pose a problem for existing firms. Unless these processes
and values can be modified, it is difficult for incumbent [!fms to make the necessary
changes in strategy.
Christensen provides a useful framework which suggests organizational changes
that can help incumbent firms with deploying disruptive technologies (see Figure 11).[7].
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He suggests organizational approaches that differ depending upon how well an
innovation fits with the organization's existing processes and values. If the innovation is
a good fit with existing processes and values it is a sustaining innovation that can be
handled with a conventional functional team or matrix-managed (lightweight) project
team. On the other hand, innovations that are a poor fit with existing processes or values
are best managed using heavyweight teams, a concept developed by Clark and
Wheelwright. [34].
Figure 11: Organizational Framework
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Heavyweight teams are small groups consisting of core members from each of the
major functional areas (R&D, marketing, manufacturing, finance, human resources) who
report directly to a senior manager. The core group is dedicated exclusively to
commercializing the innovation and is devoted to delivering a system solution to meet
customer needs. Each team member takes responsibility for the success of the entire
project not just the contribution of his or her functional area. A contract book is used to
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clearly define the team mission and expected outcomes. The heavyweight team can exist
within the existing organization if the fit with organizational values is poor but overall
values fit is good. The heavyweight team provides sufficient separation from the parent
organization to permit new processes appropriate for commercializing the innovation to
evolve. For disruptive innovations where the cultural fit with the parent organization is
poor, Christensen suggests spinning out the heavyweight team into a separate
organization. Heavyweight teams work well for commercializing disruptive technology
since they are focused and agile and can get excited about the initially small payoffs from
new businesses.
A great example of spinning out a heavyweight team in order to successfully
bring a disruptive technology to market is HP's inkjet business.[7] At the time inkjet
printing was invented HP's printing business was based on laser printers and was located
in Boise, Idaho. Although the two marking technologies had a number of similarities,
the business values were fundamentally different. Compared to laser printers, inkjet
printers were lower cost, lower margin, lower performance products that were aimed
more at home or personal printing rather than office or workgroup printing. This
difference in values led HP to start up a brand new site, remote from Boise, in
Vancouver, Washington, to focus on inkjet printer development and manufacturing. New
divisions were also started up at existing sites in Corvallis, Oregon, and San Diego to
support the inkjet work in Vancouver. This spinout strategy allowed evolution of new
values and processes appropriate for the inkjet business.
One problem with the heavyweight team idea is that if done on a widespread basis
there is a risk of corporate fragmentation and loss in knowledge sharing. In the extreme
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case a corporation becomes a very loose collection of autonomous business units. Some
of the advantages of belonging to a larger parent company are thus lost. Ghosal and
Gratton suggest a horizontal integration approach that provides needed integration in four
key areas without strangling entrepreneurial organizations with a vertical command and
control structure.[35] This approach starts with a common IT infrastructure and
knowledge database across all business units. Although this seems like common sense,
autonomous business units will make different choices in these areas unless there is a
corporate mandate for commonality. For example, prior to Carly Fiorina's reorganization
of HP in 2001, each of its 83 product divisions had its own financial reporting
system. [36] Ghosal and Gratton recommend that the common IT infrastructure and
knowledge database, which provide operational and intellectual integration, be
supplemented with social and emotional integration. Social integration is defined as
active interactions between business unit managers and can be achieved· through
collective bonds of performance. For example, social integration at BP is accomplished
through a peer challenge system in which business unit managers must gain approval of
their annual performance goals not from top management but instead from a peer group
consisting of managers of similar businesses within the company. Peer review helps
" ,: rj.~~~·\~~J rJ1{~·!,1 ~~" '.I','; _~,~;'; ;.;-:j:i'~(",;,,"/'/ '<':" "(_'~.:'_"\";" f:~ ,I
eliminate sandbagging and insures that each business unit contributes its fair share to the
.r < .',;:;, ,; • "
overall performance of the company. In addition, managers at the top performing
business units are required to help those at the bottom to improve. This system helps
drive implementation of best practices across the company.
Finally, emotional integration is achieved by emphasizing important cultural
values that are important in all business units across the company, Goldman Sachs has· a
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unifying value around client service while Johnson & Jo}wson h~~. its Credo which
summarizes strong commitment to customers, employees and community.[37] The HP
Way expresses a similar set of company-wide cultural values at Hewlett-Packard.
;' . ~.
Emotional integration can be further enhanced. through compensation or bonus schemes
that are based on overall company performance, not that of a specific division.
To summarize, it is very difficult to successfully commercialize a disruptive
technology within a large organization focused on an existing core business. The very
management practices that led to the successful core business result in "active interia",
core rigidities, and processes and values inappropriate for the new business. A small,
focused heavyweight team in a spinout organization, either inside or outside of the parent
company, has the best chance of success.
4.3 Commercialization Strategies
Once a firm has chosen an appropriate organizational structure to avoid the
"Innovator's Dilemma", the group responsible for commerciali?:ing a product based on
the new technology must decide how best to get the product to market. The strategy that
worked well for the parent organization may very well not be the right approach. A
common pitfall is to attempt to enter a mainstream market right away. Mainstream
markets are heavily defended by incumbents whQ have significant learning curve and
economy of scale advantages. They will fight fiercely to defend their core business.
Further, a strategy to attack a mainstream market right away often depends upon a major
technological breakthrough, which adds additional risk. R&D investment to achieve
significant breakthroughs should be done carefully with the customer needs and benefits
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clearly in mind.[32] A better approach is to find a market which'values the current
attributes of the technology. This market is' 'lik~ly to be a niche market rather than a
mainstream one. Profits from the niche market can help pay for investments to improve
the technology over time so that other niche markets, and eventually larger mainstream
markets can be successfully entered. [6] But which markets to target?
Christensen suggests going after the least-demanding tiers of an existing market
where the prevailing product or process over serves at least part of the customer base.[3]
The key to this "attack from the low-end" strategy is to find markets where the prevailing
product is more than good enough. The litmus test is whether or not customers in a given
market tier are willing to pay a price premium for further improvements in functionality,
reliability or convenience. If so, then a disruption from the low-end is unlikely to be
successful. Successful disruption from the low-end also requires a different business
model from the mainstream competitors. This business model should support pricing that
attracts low":end business while still offering attractive margins.
Another strategy is to create a new market of customers that are unable to use
existing products or selVices due to their high cost or complexity.[}] The idea' heniisto
compete against non-consumption rather than to try to steal customers from an
established competitor. This approach is most likely to be successful if it results in a
simple product that helps customers more easily' and effectively do what they are already
doing. A business model which requires customers to want to do something that had not
been a priority before is likely to fail.
The original Netscape and Mosaic web browsers represent a great example of
competing against non-consumption. They allowed non-experts to tap the power of the
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internet for the first time. Another example is Southwest Airline's short hop direct flight
servlce. This service made it possible for customers to conveniently travel moderate
distances quickly, which was often not possible with a car or the larger airlines' hub
systems.
When an existing firm attempts to enter a new business, the best approach may
not be to do all the development internally. Roberts and Berry provide a very useful
framework for selection of new business strategies based upon the organization's
familiarity with the market and with the technologies embodied in the product or
service. [38] See Figure 12. The suggested strategies range from internal development
and acquisitions when the familiarity with both the market and technology is relatively
high to licensing, joint ventures and venture capital investments when familiarity with
both the market and technology is low. This framework suggests that internal
development makes sense only when the firm is relatively familiar with
Figure 12: Optimum Market Entry Strategjes
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venture success is significantly higher if alternative strategies are employed. The Roberts
and Berry framework shows that an existing firm can be successful with new ventures in
unfamiliar areas if they are willing to work outside their own organization.
A second valuable framework of commercialization strategies for new businesses
is provided by Gans and Stem.[39] This framework, which builds upon importa~t earlier
work by Teece, suggests strategies for dealing with incumbents.[40] Specifically, Gans
and Stem suggest strategies based on excludability of the innovation and the value of the
incumbent's complementary assets. See Figure 13. For each scenario, strategies are
Figure 13: Commercialization Strategy Environments
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provided for both a startup and incumbent and the expected competitive dynamics are
discussed. The startup organization is in the strongest position (Greenfield
Competition) when excludability is high (i.e., the incumbent cannot easily copy the
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innovation due to patents or lack of key tacit knowledge) and the incumbent's
complementary assets (manufacturing ability, distribution channels, brand, etc.) do not
contribute significantly to the value proposition of the innovation. Here the startup can
choose between contracting and product market entry; performance depends upon the
strength of technological competition. The incumbent firm has the upper hand when
excludability is low and its complementary assets are important for commercializing the
innovation (Reputation-Based Ideas Trading). Here the incumbent can choose to either
ignore the startup or engage in trust-based trading of ideas. In the other two scenarios,
the startup either has a strong incentive to contract with incumbents (Ideas Factory) or to
move quickly to exploit its technology advantage (Attacker's Advantage).
5. Conclusion
This review has covered management literature related to disruptive technology,
technology diffusion, and commercialization strategies for new technologies with the
intention of providing insights on how inkjet might be successfully introduced as a
disruptive process technology in a new industry such as circuits or displays. Important
lessons can be distilled from the literature on how to identify a disruptive technology,
find a promising market and create an effective introduction strategy, and manage the
adoption (diffusion) process. Key lessons for this review that are directly relevant for
successful introduction of inkjet as a disruptive process technology:
• First and foremost, the inkjet process innovation must offer real compelling benefits
that produce significant cost reductions and/or productivity improvements.
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• The innovation should target a well-defined niche market ~o induce networking
effects and reduce learning costs. Ideally this market should be a new one where
important, yet unmet needs can be addressed, or an existing market where disruption
from below is possible.
• Target customers, which will be firms for a process innovation, should be chosen
carefully with an eye towards whether the innovation is disruptive to that firm's
existing business. If the process innovation is disruptive to a potential customer's
existing technology a more effective strategy may be to compete against them rather
than sell to them.
• Inkjet-based process technology must deliver a "whole product" including all service
and support needed to insure that the customer realizes the full value proposition of
the product; this will reduce uncertainty and speed diffusion. A whole product
commitment is essential to "crossing the chasm" and insuring adoption of the
innovation by pragmatic, mainstream firms.
• The right kind of information must be provided at each stage of the adoption process:
mass media to generate awareness, followed by personal references and contact
during the evaluation stage, and close support during the trial step. Making it easier
for a potential adopter to try the teclmology on a limited basis can help speed
diffusion (divisibility).
• Creating the tight organizational structure is important for success.
Commercialization of a disruptive technology within a large organization that is
focused on a different cor~ business is often difficult. Successful deployment of
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inkjet as a disruptive technology by an existing inkjet player will likely require an
internal or external spinout organization.
• Doing all development internally is often not the best or fastest way to get new
technologies to market. Other strategies, such as licensing, joint ventures or
acquisitions should be considered depending upon factors such as familiarity with the
market and technology, excludability of the technology and the importance of
incumbent's complementary assets.
Building a business strategy around these key ideas will maximize the chances of
inkjet becoming a disruptive technology in new industries.
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Inkjet Opportunities in the Flat Panel Display Industry
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This chapter explores the potential of inkjet printing to become a disruptive
technology in the flat panel display industry. This exploration will begin with
examination of key technology and business issues in the industry; this industry context
is necessary to understand the opportunities for a disruptive technology. The technology
and business discussion will be followed by an analysis of the potential for inkjet to
become a disruptive technology in the display industry and strategic recommendations
for how to best exploit this opportunity.
1. Introduction
The display industry was born with the invention ofthe cathode ray tube (CRT) in
1897.[1] Applications were chiefly limited to scientific and military instruments until
the home TV was successfully commercialized in the late 1940s.[2] The popularity of
home TV led to the initial large scale manufacturing of video displays. The development
of computing technology in the 1960s and 1970s led to additional demand for display
terminals, initially for mainframe and minicomputers and, by the 1980s, for personal
computers as well. [3] The 1990s saw the advent of large screen televisions as well as of
portable computers and handheld computing appliances (pDAs, cell phones, GameBoys,
digital cameras); these products represented entirely new markets for both large and small
display devices.
These newer markets are opt weU serv~d by CRT technology; the cathode ray
tube itself cannot be made small enough for portable devices and becomes too bulky for
large displays. CRT technology is very mature and is gradually being replaced by new,
more advanced display technologies that can better meet the. needs of both existing and
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emerging markets-.[4] This roadmap discussion will, therefore, focus on these new
display technologies, which shall be collectively referred to as flat panel displays (FPDs)
since one attribute the new technologies all have in common is dramatic reduction in the
depth of the display device compared to a CRT. In particular, discussion will focus on
today's dominant flat panel technology (Liquid Crystal Displays, LCDs) and the most
promising technology of the future (displays based upon organic light-emitting diodes,
OLEDs). It is in the emerging OLED display area where inkjet may become a critical
enabling technology.
2. Flat Panel Display Industry Value Chain
The value chain for the flat panel display industry is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Dis lay Industry Value Chain
At the left is R&D for new display technologies. Next comes manufacturing of
all the inputs required to create flat panel displays. These inputs include liquid crystal or
organic LED chemicals, glass or plastic substrates, filters, polarizing films, and
backlights. The third stage in the chain is development of the process equipment required
to manufacture the panels. This equipment is usually not produced by the display
companies themselves but is procured from companies that specialize in tooling
fabrication.
Since LCD technology is mature and a dominant design exists there is little
product development activity in these first three stages of the value chain. OLED
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display development, on the other hand, is still in the fluid phase. Firms are competing to
establish the dominant design so there is significant development activity in R&D,
materials manufacturing and process equipment.
The next two steps (highlighted in yellow) are the core of the value chain and
include the production of the display itself as well as the necessary control electronics
(backplanes and display driver chips). Large capital investments are required for these
stages. These steps are followed by integration of the displays into end products and,
finally, delivery to customers. The value chain will be discussed in more detail in the
Industry Structure section.
3. Display Technology
The flat panel display industry generated over $22 billion in revenue in 2001.
Figure 2 shows industry revenues since 1996 and also includes analyst forecasts, which
predict growth to over $40 billion by 2005.[5]
Figure 2:Worldwide Flat Panel Industry Revenue
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The great majority of industry revenue (89% in 2001) comes from displays based
on LCD technology and the bulk of this revenue (66% in 2001) is from active matrix
(AM) LCD displays. A breakdown of products using active matrix LCD displays is
shown in Figure 3. The large "other" category is testimony to the wide use of these
displays in a broad variety of both consumer and industrial products. On a panel area
basis, however, 90% of the demand comes from monitors, notebook PCs and televisions.
A breakdown of demand for large flat panels is shown in Figure 4.
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In order to understand the technology dynamics in the display industry it is
important to understand something about the dominant LCD technology.
3.1 Liquid Crystal Displays
As the name implies, liquid crystal displays are based on liquid crystal polymers.
This liquid crystal material itself does not emit light but rather serves as a shutter that
regulates light in order turn each pixel in a display on or off. The light itself is provided
by backlights (usually a mercury lamp) in the case of large format displays (laptops,
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monitors, and TVs) and by ambient light in the case of small reflective displays such as
those used for watches, calculators, and some PDAs. LCD physics is based on the ability
of liquid crystals to polarize light. The polarity state of the liquid crystals can be altered
by application of electric current. For a good introduction on how LCDs work see
Ref.[6].
A critical technology dynamics factor for LCD displays is that they are complex
devices, which are expensive to manufacture. Up to one-third of the cost of a laptop
computer derives from the LCD display! [7]
Cleaner Design, Brighter Image
No b~Wl98' An ~ctJw- ,4".
matrix, roIOf organic light- su~~:t~
ml;tlmqdiod" lriglt.lall bnlwlt'd .as
• 'm.~mkrlP.d \'erSlon Qf a lIquld~.t dKp!ay
(I<>tt), ThO!b.w< SIlucturll; thin org.nic hUht <!rnltt.~
~'Ild ....ldl"d ~f1_1 ~ (athodO!and a91.1ss anod", Gone ar" th.
bulky d1ffu_, polanrns. and (,,,,,of d." ~ Sul~lIal<l'>.
Source: Ref. [7]
A simplified LCD cross-section is shown in Figure 5. A single pixel
monochrome LCD display requires two layers of glass, two polarizing filters, an indium-
tin oxide electrode plane, a mirror or backlight, as well as a layer of the liquid crystal
material itself. Color displays are created by dividing each pixel into three sub-pixels and
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adding a color filter layer to make the subpixels red, green and blue. By varying voltage
to the subpixels, 256 intensity levels can be achieved for each of the primary colors.
Combining intensity levels among the subpixels enables a palette of over 16 million
colors.
The complexity does not end here. A matrix backplane is required to permit
control of each individual pixeL The matrix backplane consists of intercolUlects and
transistors fabricated on a glass substrate located behind the stack of layers required to
implement the LCD itself The backplanes can either be passive or active.
Passive backplanes require a transistor for each row and column; this transistor
can be located on an integrated circuit external to the display. Active matrix backplanes,
on the other hand, require a thin film transistor (TFT) immediately behind each subpixel.
The transistors are fabricated in a silicon layer (amorphous or polysilicon) deposited on
the glass substrate. It is important to note that location ofthe thin film transistors in active
matrix displays between the LCD layer and the backlight results in limits on the
minimum possible pixel size and thus the maximum resolution of the display.[8] The
size of the pixel must be large relative to the size of the TFT behind it in order in insure
that sufficient light can pass through when the pixel is on.
Passive backplanes are cheaper to manufacture but cannot support high refresh
rates or accurately control voltages at the pixel level, which is important for color
accuracy. Passive matrix backplanes are most often used in handheld devices where
these requirements are less important. Active matrix backplanes are the norm for most
all large fonnat applications, including laptops, desktop monitors and televisions. Here
the expectation to deliver at least CRT-level performance has made this more costly
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technology necessary. Figure 6 shows which products require passive or active matrix
backplanes.
Figure 6 Passive Matrix Active Matrix
Small Screen Cell Phones Cell Phones (3G)
Appliance Displays Digital Camera Displays
PDAs High-end PDAs
Calculators, Watches DVD Players
Large Screen Not Viable Notebooks
Monitors
TVs
A typical laptop display with 1024x768 resolution requires three transistors per
pixel, one for each subpixe1, for a total of over 2.3 millions transistors! If more than a
few of these pixels are bad, the display must be scrapped. Scrap rates as high as 40% are
not uncommon and are an important contributor to the high cost of LCD displays since
the price of the good displays must cover the cost of the scrapped ones. This yield
problem only gets worse as display size is increased.
Most active matrix backplanes are fabricated in amorphous silicon; amorphous
silicon has significantly lower carrier mobility than the single crystal silicon used for
fabrication of integrated circuits so transistor performance is generally poor. It is good
enough for switching LCD pixels off and on but not adequate for handling the logic and
mixed signal processing required to drive the display. Amorphous silicon active matrix
displays thus require external silicon chips to handle these functions.
There is, however, an industry trend, led by Toshiba, toward higher perfonnance
matrix backplanes.[5] These backplanes use a polysilicon instead of amorphous silicon
substrate. Carrier mobilities are much higher, around 90% of that possible with single
crystal silicon, thus permitting integration of much of the logic handled by external chips
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In amorphous silicon displays. The polysilicon backplanes are more expensive to
manufacture but this integration provides cost savings for devices with smaller displays
where external display driver chips are a higher fraction of the total display cost.
Elimination of external driver chips also reduces weight and enables thinner form factors.
Over timeJ as yields improve and costs decrease polysilicon backplanes should migrate to
larger display products such as notebook computers and monitors.
Polysilicon backplanes are very important for the technology dynamics for
displays because, in addition to enabling cost savings for LCD displays they are
absolutely necessary for larger OLED displays.
In addition to their high cost and complexity, LCD displays an~ rigid, fi-aglle and
suffer from image quality problems. These issues are directly related to their
architecture. The many layers ofglass and filters required to make an LCD display limit
light transmission, thus reducing brightness and' contrast, and constraining viewing angle.
Power consumption is also high since a bright backlight must always be ~n regardless on
, : ':' "; l" , ' ,
how many pixels are lit.[9] Displays are the major power consumer in laptops and are
largely responsible for short battery life. Further, even fast 'switching active matrix
technology has trouble with high frame rate video applications.
~. ' T
The weaknesses of the dominant LCD technology, especially price and sub-par
image attributes, are important for technology dynamics since emerging technologies
must successfully address these weaknesses in order'to gain market share. For example,
LCD technology is currently not economical for screen sizes above 30" (diagonal).[5]
The primary flat panel technology for larger screen sizes is plasma displays.[IO]
Chapter 3 p.74 of 178
3.2 Plasma Displays
Plasma displays are very expensive; prices are around $100 per diagonal inch.
Prices start at $3500 for a 32" unit and go up from there.[10] They can, however, be
manufactured in sizes up to 50" and are currently used chiefly for niche business and
commercial applications such as information displays for airports and high-end
presentation displays for conference rooms. The consumer big screen TV market is,
however, becoming an important growth driver.[5] Plasma displays provide a thin form
factor alternative to bulky rear-projection systems for home theatres.
With plasma displays, each red, green and blue subpixel is individually lit;
intensity is varied by adjusting the number and width of voltage pulses applied to each
cell. The result is a nice bright image without the viewing angle problems common with
LCDs. Image quality is not yet equal to that of top quality CRTs but the technology is
improving. In spite of their advantages over LCDs, plasma display technology is likely
to be competitive only in the market for very large displays. Plasma displays are not
economical at sizes below 30" where there is tough competition from LCD and,
especially, traditional CRT technology.
Note that LCD suppliers have not given up on the large screen market. The
newest LCD fabs under constructions will be able to produce panels using 1500mm x
1800 mm substrates. These fabs will be able to produce 40" and larger LCD televisions
and displays that should be competitive with plasma displays. Sharp expects to begin
volume production in such a fab next January and is so confident in their eventual
success that they have decided to drop their entire plasma television product line.[II]
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3.3 Organic Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs)
The technology more likely to threaten Lebs in the market\\f~r large and small
format displays is that based on organic light-emitting diodes (GLEDs). GLEDs were
discovered in 1979 by a Kodal: resea~cher with scientific publication or the resuHs
coming eight years later. [12]
GLEDs are based on the phenomenon of organic electroluminescence.' 'Certain
organic molecules can efficiently convert electricity into light; the color of the emitted
light can be tuned by adjusting the chemistry. Further, the lightfrom the molecules can
be switched off and on very rapidly,' These features make' OLEDs' a very 'compelling
display technology that could potenii~ny :disrupt the: LCD hegem~ny.
The GLED display architecture is much simpler than that for LeOs (see Figure
5). Since the OLEDs emit light directly there is no need for the polaiizers,backl'1'ghts,
color filters and diffusers required for LCOs. this· simplicity makes'OLEtfdisplays
thinner and lighter than their LCD counterparts and could also translate into
manufacturing costs that are 20-50% lower.[7][13] Further, OLEDs offer superior
brightness (visible even in bright daylight), contrast, and image quality_ OLEDs also
have a big advantage in power efficiency since there is no backlight and only the pixels
that are on consume energy. A laptop with 'an OLED display could have a 10 hour
battery life vs. 2 or 3 hours with today's best LCD-equipped models. [9] In short, OLED
displays are everything that LCD displays are not; they seem to otTer both higher
performance and lower cost.
The promise of OLEn displays has attracted a large number of companies that
hope to create and capture value in this emerging market. Over 80 companies worldwide
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are involved in the OLED business.[7] The OLED market had only $100M in revenues
in 2002 but is projected to grow at a CAGR of 740/0to reach $2.88 by 2008 (see Figure
7). [14] There are currently four different 0LED technologies competing to become the
dominant design.
OLEO Revenue Growth
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3.3.1 Competing OLEO Technologies
The leading contender at present is Kodak's fluorescent small molecule OLED
technology. This technology has been under development the longest and has already
been commercialized in several products, including a car audio system and cell phone.
See Figure 8. Kodak has also broadly licensed their technology, chiefly to Asian
companies already in the flat panel display business. See Figure 9.
Kodak's technology lead stems from the fact that small molecule OLEDs were
invented first and from the fact that the manufacturing approach leverages process
technology used for LCDs. Small molecule OLED material is deposited using a vacuum
vapor deposition process. The OLED material is vaporized in a vacuum system and then
Chapter 3 p.77 of 178
Fi2ure 8 Matrix ofProduct and Display Technologies
f.tr. = OLED Mileston~ . "
Product 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2019
Sm. LCD LCD LCD OLED OLED
Appliance
* *
OLED LCD
Cell Phone LCD LCD LCD OLED OLED
.¥ OLED LCDLCD
PDAs LCD LCD LCD OLED OLED
OLED LCD LCD
Notebooks LCD LCD * LCD LCD OLEDOLED LCD
Monitors CRT CRT LCD LCD OLED
LCD CRT OLED LCD
Televisions CRT CRT CRT LCD LCD
LCD LCD CRT OLED
OLED CRT
Large Projection Projection Plasma Plasma LCD
Screen Plasma LCD LCD OLED
Projection OLED Plasma
Flexible N/A N/A N/A Small Large
Displays OLED OLED
Sources: [5, 15-17]
Note: Technologies in a given box listed in order of prevalence. Future prevalence orders
are educated guesses.
OLED Milestones (denoted by stars=& in table above)
1979 - Discovery of small molecule OLEDs at Kodak
1989 - Discovery of light-emitting polymers at Cambridge Univ.
1999 - First small molecule OLED display introduced (pioneer car audio display,
monochrome, PM)
2000 - First cell phone introduced with OLED display (Motorola, 2 color, PM)
2002 - First polymer OLED product introduced (philips shaver, monochrome, PM)
2002 - First cell introduced with full color OLED display (Samsung-NEC, PM)
2002 - Kodak introduces first full-color, AM OLED display, 5.48 em (2.16 in)
2002 - Sony demos prototype of 13" AM-OLED display
condenses onto a cooled display substrate. A shadow mask is used to control location of
each subpixel-sized spot of material. [7] Although this fabrication approach is relatively
well understood, it is both costly and delicate. Another problem with small molecule
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OLEDs is poor power efficiency, which may limit their use to small screen
applications. [5]
Figure 9: Alliances and Partnerships
Company Kodak Cambridge Display Universal Display
Technology Corp.
Material Type Fluorescent Small Light Emitting Phosphorescent
Molecule Polymer & Dendrimer Small Molecule
OEMs, Denso Microemissive Samsung
Partners Emagin Displays Motorola
Lite Array Opsys (IP) Sony
NEC Osram DuPont
Nippon Seiko Philips
Opsys Dow
Opto Tech
Pioneer
Ritek
Rohm
Samsung
Sanyo (JV)
SNMD
Sumitomo
TDK
Teco
Varitronix
Optrex
Chemicals Kodak Covion PPG
DuPont
Hoechst
Dow
Process Ulvac Seiko Epson Aixtron
Equip. Litrex (acquisition)
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A competing technology is being developed by Cambridge Display Technology
(CDT) (Cambridge, U.K.) and its partners_ The eDT OLED is based on light-emitting
polymers (LEPs), which are much larger molecules than those used by Kodak. [7, 18] An
important advantage of LEPs is that they can be readily dissolved in liquids. The
solubility of the eDT's light-emitting polymers means that they can be applied to
substrates by spraying or by using low cost printing technologies such as inkjet. [9] The
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process technology required to print polymer OLED materials is immature hut has the
potential to be much cheaper than the more mature vacuum deposition process required
for Kodak's small molecule materials and standard LCD processing. The big cost
savings will be realized with the use of plastic substrates since they would allow
deposition of display materials in a roll-to-roll process similar to that used for printing
newspapers. If such plastic substrates can be used for both the display materials and the
backplane electronics (see Chapter 4) then a truly flexible display could be produced.
Applications might include a roll-up display for laptops or very thin, lightweight wall
mounted displays for home and commercial use. The biggest obstacle to use of plastic
substrates is their permeability to moisture and oxygen, which degrade the OLED
material. [13]
The development of printing technologies for LEPs is perhaps the best
opportunity for existing inkjet companies to capture value in the OLED industry.
Competencies in developing and driving printheads for traditional printing applications
are directly relevant for deposition of OLED materials. Philips, eDT and others are
already experimenting with inkjet deposition techniques.[13, 19] eDT recently acquired
Litrex, a Fremont, California, startup that has developed a piezo inkjet-based machine
tool for deposition of OLED materials. [20, 21] eDT is also partnering with Seiko Epson,
the lone piezoelectric player in the mainstream inkjet printing market, as well as a
manufacturer of active matrix backplanes.
There is, however, no guarantee that inkjet will become the printing method of
choice for OLEDs. Tappan, a Japanese printi~g company, and world leader in
production of color filters for LCD displays ~a~ re,cently announced acquisition of an
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equity position in COT and plans for joint development of OLEO displays using light-
emitting polymer technology. [22] COT is clearly hedging their bets on which process
technology will be best for creating LEP displays.
A third technology being developed for the OLEO display market is
phosphorescent OLEOs (PHOLEOs). This technology is being developed by Universal
Oisplay Corporation (UDC, New Jersey) and research partners at Princeton and the
University of Southern California. Phosphorescent OLEOs offer the potential of near
100% efficiency as opposed to a maximum of around 25% for fluorescent OLEOs.[23]
UDC has demonstrated better power efficiency (candelas/ Amp) for all three primary
colors (red, green blue) than is possible with either Kodak's small molecule or CDT's
LEP technology. [5] See Figure 10. This higher power efficiency translates into longer
Fi ure 10: OLED Lifetime vs. Power Efficienc
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battery life for hand-held devices such as cell phone and PDAs. UDC recently
announced a strategic alliance with OuPont to produce a printable phosphorescent OLED
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material. [24] Such a material would combine the performance advantage of small
molecule GLEDs with the printability of polymer OLEDs.
UDe has not lined up as many partners and licensees as Kodak or CDT but has
forged key partnerships across the supply chain to allow them to take their technology to
market. Although UDC has not yet commercialized a product based on their technology
they recently demonstrated a working prototype of a cell phone (produced by partner
Samsung) with a full-color active matrix display based on the PHOLED technology. [25]
The fourth OLED technology under development is based on dendrimer
technology being developed by Opsys Displays in Oxford, U.K. Opsys was founded in
1997 and is a spin-out of Oxford University.[26] Dendrimer-based OLEDs have the
potential to combine the best aspects of small molecule and polymer OLEDs.
Dendrimers are large, sphere-shaped macromolecules with a light-emitting core. The
core is connected by branching groups (dendrons) to surface groups. The surface groups
can be engineered to improve process characteristics without affecting performance of
the light emitting core within. The ultimate goal is to create a phosphorescent OLED
material that can be solution processed. In this respect, the goals of the dendrimer
technology are very similar to what UDC is trying to achieve with their alliance with
DuPont. Although dendrimer OLED technology has yet to be commercialized, it is
attracting significant interest in the industry. In fact, Cambridge Display Technology
recently acquired Opsys' entire dendrimer business. This move was likely intended to
diversify CDT's OLED investment risk.
Chapter 3 p.82 of 178
3.3.2 OLEO Technical Challenges
Despite the exciting promise of the fOUf contending OLEO display technologies,
there are significant technical obstacles. One important issue is device lifetime ,and
stability. Differential fading of the LEDs can occur in just one month of on time and
LED lifetimes can be as short as 1000 hours. [7] These shortcomings must be resolved
before OLED displays can be used in high "on time" applications such as monitors and
TVs. Short OLED lifetimes are, however, not a major issue for low on-time, small
screen applications such as cell phones, and audio and appliance displays. For example,
cell phone screens typically see only about 200 hours of use before being replaced. It is
in these markets where OLED is finding a commercial "beachhead". See Figure 8.
The first significant commercial applications for OLED displays have been color
displays for high-end cell phones. This application requires only a small screen and plays
well to OLED's strong video performance and low power consumption. Growth in
demand for 3G cell phones should enable OLED displays to capture a significant share of
the cell phone display market, which is estimated to by grow to $7.5B by 2005.[7] Other
early opportunities for OLEDs include viewfinders for digital cameras and PDA displays.
Ironically, OLEDs are also being investigated as more efficient backlight sources for
traditional LCD displays. The biggest ppportunity for OLEDs is to make sufficient
improvements (lifetime, cost) to be able to take on LeDs in the, market for the larger
displays (>15") used in laptops, monitors and TVs. Such improvements, however, are
probably 5-10 years away. Figure 8 shows the predicted advance of OLED technology
into various markets over time.
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Another issue is that OLED displays, like LeDs, require matrix backplanes to
enable their operation. Passive matrix backplanes for OLEDs can only drive small
displays (160x120 pixels) before hitting voltage limits; active matrix backplanes are thus
required for most applications. Active matrix backplanes for OLEOs require several
transistors per pixel to achieve the needed current control and are thus even more
complex and expensive than those required for LCDs.
Fortunately, the higher performance polysilicon backplane technology being
developed for the LCD industry can support the additional logic required for OLED
active matrix backplanes. The polysilicon backplanes are, however, more expensive than
the amorphous silicon backplanes used in most LCD displays and offset some of the
OLED cost advantage. OLEDs ability to leverage a key enabling technology for LCD
displays make it a modular rather than a radical innovation and should help speed its
adoption.
Fabrication costs also pose a challenge. Although OLED displays should have a
cost advantage after several years of high volume production, the technology will
probably be more expensive initially due to high startup costs and low yields. Major
cost breakthroughs are possible if low cost roll-to-roll processing can be realized.[13]
Roll-to-roll processing not only requires deposition of OLED materials on plastic but also
development of better packaging and encapsulation methods to protect sensitive OLED
materials from light and oxygen.
3,,4 Innovation Dynamics
The display industry is a slow c10ckspeed industry.[27] It takes a long time for
display innovations to be commercialized and to displace the dominant design. Over the
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last century there have only been a few major display innovations, such as the transition
from black-and-white to color CRTs and introduction of LCD flat panel displays.[9] The
displacement of LCD displays by OLED displays may be the next major transition.
Evidence of this slow clockspeed is provided in Figure 11. For example, the CRT
was invented in 1897, first commercialized in the late 1940s and is still the dominant
large display technology today. LCD technology, invented in 1968, is just beginning to
displace CRTs in markets where the two technologies compete. Similarly OLEDs,
discovered in 1979 and first announced in the scientific literature in 1987, are just
beginning to be commercialized in one or two narrow market segments.[12]
Fi ure 11: Dis lay Technology Timelines
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Innovations in display technology do not always come from within the
mainstream industry. For example, the major OLED technologies were either developed
by a firm outside the industry (Kodak) or in university research labs (Cambridge,
Princeton, Oxford) that later spun out startup companies.
LCD display technology, on the other hand, did have its orIgIns within the
mainstream industry. It was initially developed in the 1960s by scientists at ReA, a
major player in the television manufacturing industry at the time.[28, 29] This research
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was motivated by RCA's' chief executive David Sarnoff: who had the vision ora wali-
mounted television. AlthotighRCAlnv~tlted LCD 'displays, they decidecf '~~tio purs~e
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their commercialization, perhaps because these displays did not satisfy needs of existing
customers. RCA engineers then left the company and founded LCD startups such as
Optel and Microma. Sarnoff's dream of a thin wall-mounted television was finally
realized in 198'8 when Sharp demonstrated a14~in'ch color LCD di~play.'RCA'sfailure
to successfully commercialize disruptive LCD technology is very similar to dynamics of
the disk drive industry, studied by Christensen, where leading companies consIstently
failed to recognize disruptive technologies until it was too late.[3'O]
The diffusion of new display technologies is strongly influenced by the type of
market in which they are introduced. Diffusion of new display technologies is slower in
established markets where they must compete directly with the dominant technology as
LCDs are doing in the monitor and TV markets. Here, cost plays a dominant role in
driving display transitions. [14] Diffusion is faster when the dominant technology is not
well suited to a new market~ the rapid adoption of LCDs for laptop displays is a case in
point.
The latter is a good example of the "compete against non-consumption" strategy
suggested by Clay Christensen. [31] LCD displays helped to create' a whole new
portable computer market that had not existed before. Early portable computers, based
on CRT displays, such as the Osborne, were just too big and clumsy for most people to
llse.[32]
LCD displays followed the "disrupt from below" trajectory'into'themainsiream
display market~ Christensen suggests that this pattern is' {ypiCal of disruptive
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technologies. See Figure 12. LCD displays were first adopted in niche markets such as
calculators and watches where ancillary factors such as power requirements and form
factor were more important than the primary CRT performance factors of price and
image quality. LCD displays then appeared in laptop computers and are now attacking
the mainstream CRT markets for televisions and desktop monitors.
LCD displays followed the disrupt from below trajectory into the mainstream
market without ever being cheaper than the mainstream CRT technology (which
Christensen suggests is usually the case). Christensen's contention that the mainstream
technology will continue to improve until it exceeds what the mainstream market requires
is also not borne out in the case of LCD and CRT displays. In this case, the dominant
CRT technology reached a performance plateau years ago and has not continued to
improve to levels that exceed what customers require.
Figure 12: Christensen's Disruptive Technolog Framework
Performance
Time
Source: Adapted from Ref. [33]
OLED displays do not fit Christensen's definition of a disruptive technology as
one that has lower performance and lower cost and initially penetrates a niche market on
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the strength of ancillary attributes. Instead, OLEO displays have higher performance and
higher cost than the dominant LCD technology and are being introduced into mainstream
markets where LCD displays are well entrenched. So far no major-applications' 'have
been identified where OLED displays" win not be competing with more mature
teclmologies.
,...... "". . ,
The major players In the dominant LCD technology are also not' behaving
according to the Innovator's Dilemma model. They are, as Christensen prediCts',
improving performance and going after higher margin customers (e.g., 30" and larger
displays) but are also simultaneously aggressively reducing cost to increase market .share
in the desktop monitor and smaller screen television « 30") markets. The fact that
OLED displays do not fit with Christensen's framework certainly does not mean that they
will not be successful in eventually displacing LCDs; it is indication, however, that this
transition is unlikely to happen quickly and easily.
3.5 Technology Summary
LeDs are by far the dominant flat panel display technology and will not easily be
unseated in most applications. LeDs have issues with high cost, image quality, and
power consumption but the major players have strong incentives to make improvements
in these areas. Newer flat panel display technologies, plasma and OLED, are attacking
LeDs at the extremes of the display size spectrum. For displays between 15" and 30" in
size LeDs compete chiefly with traditional CRT technology. OLED displays have many
compelling attributes and may eventually make LCDs obsolete but the technology is still
immature and such a displacement is still some years away. Inkjet printing may become
an important enabling technology for manufacturing of OLED displays. Unlike
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Christensen's disk drives, GLEDs have higher price and higher performance than the
dominant LCD technology and are attempting to compete in mainstream instead of niche
markets.
4" Customer Preferences
Customer preferences are an important driver for development of flat panel
display technology. Key high level customer needs drivers are entertainment and
information. Entertainment needs include high quality, color video-capable displays in
both large (home theatres) and small screen formats (handheld devices). Information
needs include higher resolution, information rich displays, especially for portable
handheld devices, that can improve productivity. The growth in markets for products
with very large and very small displays, where CRT technology is either not suitable or
less desirable, has definitely fueled demand for flat panel displays.
4. 1 Needs Hierarchies
Figure 13 shows customer needs hierarchies for displays for both portable
devices, where the display is integrated into a product such as. a cell phone or PD~ and
for large stand-alone displays such as computer monitors and large-screen televisions.
Needs hierarchies are somewhat specific to the actual products that the displays are used
in but this division provides a good sense of th.e differences between these major market
segments.
For portable devices small size and weight are at the bottom level of the needs
hierarchy; displays without these attributes cannot be integrated into handheld or portable
devices. Flat panel displays for portable devices are thus not competing with mature
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CRT technology. Just above size and weight in the needs hierarchy for portable displays
comes power consumption. Handheld computing appliances run chiefly on batteries and
the display is typically a major consumer of power. More power efficient displays can
significantly extend battery life.
Fi ure 13: Customer Needs Hierarchies for Portable and Stand-Alone Dis lays
Portable Displays Stand-Alone
Displays
When these needs are met customers focus on image quality, which includes
attributes such as brightness, contrast and resolution. The early Palm Pilot products were
weak here but still saw high adoption rates. High resolution is particularly important for
applications where the display is held close to the eye.
After image quality comes color capability, and finally video capability. Video
capability refers to the ability to display high frame rate video feeds or movies. The
advent of 2.5G and 3G wireless technology is expected to increase demand for displays
that provide color and video capability in mobile environments.[5] Note that for some
portable appliances such as digital cameras or 3G cell phones, color and video capability
is a must, rather than a want attribute.
Stand-alone flat panel displays are used chiefly for desktop monitors and
televisions. In much of this market FPDs, which are currently all LCD based, are
displacing CRTs so the expectations for color and video are based on CRT performance;
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these attributes therefore occupy the lowest level in the needs pyramid. Another low-
level need for large FPDs is affordability; the major factor slowing diffusion ofFPDs into
large screen markets is price. For example, I?" CRT monitors are available for less than
$100 while 17" LCD monitors start at about $400.[34] Similarly, a 20" CRT television
retails for about $200 vs $2000 and up for an LCD TV.[34] Demand is proving to be
strongly price elastic so demand is expected to ramp up as prices fall.[5] There is lots of
room for growth since market penetration of FPDs is still quite low, 18 % for desktop
monitors and just 2% for televisions. [5]
Next on the needs hierarchy for large format FPDs are image-related attributes.
This is an area where today's dominant LCD technology is not particularly strong. LCD
brightness, contrast and viewing angle are customer dissatisfiers. Emerging FPO
technologies, such as OLEOs, address many of these shortcomings.
Further up the needs hierarchy for large FPDs are size and weight. The smaller
size and weight of FPDs compared to eRTs is a major factor driving their adoption.
Computer users appreciate the significant gain in desktop area achieved by switching to
smaller form factor FPDs. Some office users are taking advantage of the smaller FPD
form factor to add a second monitor to the~r gesktops to boost productivity. Television
buyers also appreciate the fonn factor advantages of FPDs. They are more space
efficient and can even be wall mounted. Fl,lrther, FPD technology (especially plasma)
scales to screen sizes (>50") otherwise achievable only with bulky rear-projection
systems.
At the top of the pyramid are attributes like radiation emissions, display lifetime,
resolution and cost of ownership. These are areas where FPDs have advantages over
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CRTs but are unlikely to become important competitive attributes until most·· of the
lower-level needs are met. High resolution (200 dpi) is particularly important for
handheld and portable devices where viewing distances are less than 12 inches. As
discussed earlier, LCD display architecture limits maximum possible resolution.
4.2 Performance Comparison
Figure 14 compares OLED and LCD performance in areas important to
customers. OLED perfonnance is superior on almost every attribute. This performance
dominance is the key reason that OLED displays are likely to eventually displace LCDs
in both small and large screen applications. Price will be an important factor governing
this displacement rate; development of manufacturing processes capable of producing
OLED displays cost effectively is criticaL The history ofLeD displays shows the strong
effect high prices have in slowing adoption in markets where the new technology is a
substitute for an existing one. Also, OLED display lifetimes must be improved to 20,000
hours or better to allow the technology to break out of its current low display on-time
product niche.
Figure 14: Comparison orLeD and OLED Displays
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Source: Ref [35]
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It is an important to note that the government, especially the military, is an
important customer for flat panel display technology. Government needs are typically
well ahead of those of other consumers and help drive development of emerging display
technologies, such as wearable and "heads up" displays. Further discussion of the effect
ofgovernment on display technology appears in the Regulatory Policy Dynamics section.
5. Industry & Business Dynamics
5.1 Industry Structure
Like the memory chip industry, the LCD display industry is heavily concentrated
in Asia, specifically in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Flat panel display manufacturing is
capital and labor intensive and can only be profitably accomplished by large firms with
significant expertise in high tech manufacturing and access to cheap labor. Both memory
chips and LCD flat panel displays are commodity products which require huge capital
investments (a new LCD fab costs $lB) and offer only thin profit margins. The world's
#1 supplier is Samsung. Other major Korean players are LG Phillips4 and Hydis. In
Japan the major firms are Sharp, Hitachi and Toshiba. The major Taiwanese companies
are AU Optronics, Chie Mei Opto and Chungwa Picture. [5]
The structure of the LCD display industry is quite fragmented across the value
chain. See Figure 2. There is no one vertically integrated company that is active in all
segments. Most firms in this industry participate in just one or two stages of the value
chain. Since this industry is quite mature the maj or players in the R&D stage are chiefly
the R&D departments of large display manufacturers such as Samsung and Sharp.
4 A joint venture between Phillips N.V. of the Netherlands and LG Electronics of South Korea.
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Materials suppliers tend to specialize in one key input to the flat panel display such as
glass substrates (Corning, Nippon Sheet Glass), liquid crystal polymer (Merck, Hitachi),
or color filters (Tappan, Dai Nippon) and are rarely the same companies that actually
make the flat panels. Process equipment for the LCD industry is supplied chiefly by
companies such as Applied Materials that make similar equipment for the semiconductor
industry.
The flat panel companies themselves tend to specialize in the complex panel
manufacturing process. Some of them also make their own passive or active matrix
backplanes while others outsource this step. Off~panel display driver chips are typically
supplied by semiconductor companies. Some of the large, diversified Japanese
companies (Hitachi, NEC) have this capability in house. Integration of the displays into
final products is often done by OEMs; however, many of the large Asian companies also
make their own monitors and TVs (Sharp, Hitachi, Samsung). Some companies such as
Three-Five Systems specialize in integration of flat panel displays into specialty products.
Like the LCD display industry, the OLED industry structure is also quite
fragmented across the value chain. The major differences between the two industries are
in the R&D, materials development and process eql;lipment stages. Participants in the
R&D stage are the firms responsible for invention of one of the four major OLED
technologies (CDT, UDC, and Ko.dak). With the exception of Kodak, which also has
materials manufacturing capability, these firms license their technology to other firms in
the value chain in order to create products. Firms in the materials stage are all chemical
companies that have arrangements with the OLED technology companies to scale up
manufacturing of OLED materials (e.g., Covion, Dow, DuPont) With the exception of
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DuPont these chemical companies are not attempting to participate in other stages of the
value chain.
DuPont sees high strategic value in OLEDs and is also making investments in
both R&D and display module manufacturing. R&D investments include acquisition in
2000 of Uniax, a California-based company working in the LEP area. [36] DuPont has
created an Olight brand for their OLED display products an.d began ~hippin~ evaluati0!1
kits to customers in December 2002. [37, 38] DuPont is definitely a company to watch as
the OLED industry evolves.
A significant weakness in the OLED value chain is in the process equipment
stage. Technology development is particularly immature for polymer OLEDs. There is
considerable excitement over the potential of inkjet technology to evolve into a low cost
manufacturing method but a product based on this approach has yet to be successfully
commercialized. With the exception of Seiko Epson, the companies that are trying to
develop inkjet into an OLED manufacturing technology have little previous experience
with the technology. There appears to be a significant opportunity for major inkjet
players such as lIP and Canon to apply their years of inkjet expertise to development of
OLED machine tools.
A key question is whether thermal inkjet, the dominant inkjet technology used for
traditional printing, is well-suited to deposition of OLED materials. All of the OLED
inkjet development so far is based on piezoelectric inkjet. Piezo inkjet seems to have
some advantages in that it does not require vaporization of OLED material in order to
drive drop ejection.
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The rest of the value 'chain f~r OLED displays looks very similar to that for LCD
displays. Companies that have licenses to build display panels based on OLED
'" > ~ , i
technology are largely firms that are in the LCD industry (e.g, Samsung, Philips). These
firms have competencies in high volume 'display manufacturing and can leverage their
knowledge of display control electronics. Finally, integration of the displays into final
products and product distribution' w'ill' be ~ccomplished in the same way as for Len
displays. The fact that both LCD and OLED displays use similar matrix backplane
technology makes this task easier.
Fi ure 15: Double Helix
Source: [27, 39]
Professor Charles Fine of l\1IT's Sloan School of Management has developed a
double-helix framework which attempts to explain the evolution of industry structure
over time. [27] See Figure 15. The OLED and LCD display industries are quite dis-
integrated and are on the right-hand side of the helix. Industry forces do not seem to be
driving things back towards a vertically integrated structure very quickly_ The last time
the industry was strongly vertically integrated was in the early days of the TV industry in
the 19508, more than fifty years ago. This very slow transition from integration to dis-
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integration is characteristic of a slow clockspeed industry. As discussed earlier, some
consolidation is expected in the OLED industry once a dominant design emerges.
5.2 Competitive Attributes
Since LCD flat panels are a commodity good the basis for competition is chiefly
price. The major LCD manufacturers are therefore heavily focused on yield
improvement and achievement of scale econgmies through construction of new fabs that
can handle larger glass substrate sizes. Yields have improved from 60-70% for
Generation 1 and 2 fabs built in the early 1990s to 90% for the latest Generation 5
factories.
Larger substrate sizes allow more flat panel displays to be produced from the
same piece of glass and thus offer the same advantages that larger wafer sizes offer to
semiconductor companies. The difference is that the LCD substrates are much larger
than wafers. The latest Generation 5 substrates are 1.1 x 1.25 meters and yield a dozen
15" display panels each. Figure 16 shows the aggressive increase in substrate sizes over
time. Substrate areas have doubled every 3.6 years since LCD fabs came on line in 1990.
This compares to a doubling every 7.5 years for silicon substrates.
In the immature OLED display industry the basis of competition is chiefly on the
. performance attributes of the competing technologies. This type of competition is
expected for an industry that has not yet produced a dominant design. Once a dominant
design emerges the competitive dynamics should become more similar to that for the
mature LCD industry with increased focus on scale economies and process improvements
to reduce cost.
Chapter 3 p.97 of 178
Fi ure 16: LCD Substrate Sizes
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5.3 Industry Dynamics
X Dimension (mm)
The dynamics in the LCD industry are consistent with Utterback's framework on
industry structure.[40] The LCD display industry is a mature industry, characterized by a
relatively small number of firms and heavy focus on process as opposed to product
innovation. The dominant design for LCD displays is well established so the primary
basis of competition is process innovations to reduce manufacturing cost and to improve
image quality attributes. One opportunity for further efficiencies in the LCD industry
would be standardization of substrate sizes. Within each size generation there are as
many as five slightly different substrate sizes across different companies.[5] These size
differences increase manufacturing costs because process tooling must be customized for
each unique size.
The dynamics in the OLED display industry are quite different but also fit with
Utterback's framework. This industry is immature and very much in the fluid phase.
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This phase is characterized by a large number of firms competing to establish a dominant
design. At present there are over 80 firms participating in the OLED industry and four
different technologies vying to become the dominant design. Utterback's framework
suggests that a dominant OLED technology will eventually emerge. Once the dominant
design is determined there will be a significant reduction in the number of participating
firms as companies exit the market, are acquired or go out of business. The remaining
firms will focus increasingly on process innovations to reduce cost and improve
performance.
5.4 Business Cycles
The flat panel display industry is characterized by a strong supply-demand
balance and is strongly cyclical. This cyclical nature is illustrated in Figure 17, which
shows the ratio of capital investment to revenue over time. This metric signals
overinvestment when above 30% and underinvestment when below 20%.[5] This
cyclical trend is driven by the large capacity of new LCD fabs, which introduce
additional supply in large chunks, and the strong price elasticity of demand for LCD
displays in markets where they are substitutes for CRTs. Excess capacity leads to falling
prices; the lower prices fuel demand eventually leading to increasing prices, which finally
leads to another round of overinvestment. This cycle seems to have a period of about
three years based on recent data. The LCD industry is quickly developing the moody
boom-bust dynamics of other electronics commodities such as DRAM.[14]
The OLED display industry is too immature to have developed a characteristic
business cycle. The technology is just beginning to be commercialized and some of the
major players (e.g., UDC, CDT) are still chiefly focused on R&D and process
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development. As the OLED display industry matures the bullwhip effect may impact
the supply chain with companies further upstream seeing stronger cyclicality than those
closer to the end product.
Fi ure 17: Investment Cycles
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5.5 Corporate Strategy Dynamics
Porter's Five Forces framework is a useful tool for understanding the strategies
that different firms are pursuing in the flat panel display industry.[41] A Five Forces
model for this industry appears in Figure 18. For the mainstream flat panel display
market, which is chiefly LCD displays for notebooks and monitors, rivalry among
existing firms is high. As discussed above, LCDs have become a high-tech commodity
product and the many firms in the business compete chiefly on price. For these same
reasons, power of buyers is also high. Companies building laptops or monitors have
many flat panel suppliers to choose from. They can switch suppliers relatively easily
due to industry standards for displays.
The threat level of substitutes is high for larger LCD panels that go into desktop
monitors and televisions; here CRTs are well-established and much cheaper. Threat of
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Fi ure 18: Porter's Five Forces Analysis of Flat Panel Display Indust
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substitutes is also high for the large display screen (>30") where plasma displays are
well-established and rear-projection display systems are also an alternative. For smaller
panels used in notebook computers and handheld devices, the threat of substitutes is low.
CRTs aren't an option here and new technologies such as OLEDs are not yet well
established. However, as OLED technology begins to penetrate the small screen market,
there will be increased cost pressure on LCD manufacturers. Since, LCD display
performance is largely inferior to that of OLEDs, LCD firms will have little choice but to
compete with 0LEDs on the basis of cost.
Threat of new entrants is relatively low for mainstream LCD displays. There are
many players already and the high capital costs and low margins are likely to discourage
new players. Further, new entrants are unlikely to enter this market with OLED
technology before the end of the decade. On the other hand, threat of new entrants is
somewhat higher for small screens, where LCD technology is ubiquitous. OLED
technology looks like a credible threat to disrupt this market but significant disruption is
probably 5-10 years out. Finally, power of suppliers to major LCD manufactures is
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moderate. There are several large suppliers for important LCD materials such as liquid
crystal polymer, glass substrates, backlights, and color filters. Suppliers of OLED
material and technology will have high supplier power as this technology becomes more
prevalent. Patent protection of the dominant OLED design should limit the number of
competing firms offering this technology for a while. However, key early patents begin
to expire as early as 2004 for small molecule OLED technology and 2007 for polymer
OLEDs so this supplier power advantage may be short-lived.
The high levels of three of these forces (Rivalry, Buyer Power, and Substitutes)
help explain the fierce competition in the mainstream market and concentration of
manufacturing in Asia where high-tech manufacturing know-how and favorable cost
structures co-exist. These high forces also explain why other firms are not rushing into
the mainstream business and why non-Asian firms are focused on other parts of the
display value chain, such as R&D and customization of displays for specific non-
mainstream markets.
A key driver of corporate strategy for OLEDs is technology uncertainty. A
dominant design has yet to emerge and it is still unclear as to which technology will win
in the marketplace. Companies are trying to reduce risk by betting on more than one
technology or limiting their commitment to just a portion of the value chain. Even larger
players like Kodak and Philips are not pursuing a high investment, vertical integration
strategy. The result is a complex web of licensing, joint development agreements,
alliances and acquisitions. See Figure 9. Asian firms that are heavily invested in LCD
displays are chiefly backing Kodak's more mature small molecule OLED technology.
The small molecule technology, though probably not the least expensive in the long run,
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allows them to get OLED display products to market sooner to defend their business as
customer awareness of and preference for superior OLED displays develops. European
and US companies that do not have a major LCD business to defend are chiefly backing
the less mature but potentially less expensive polymer or other OLED technologies that
can be solution-processed.
6. Regulatory Policy Dynamics
Significant government support for the U.S. display industry comes from the
military, specifically the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The
military views displays as windows into the world of information. Information is an
increasingly important part of modem warfare so advanced display technology is seen as
having high strategic value. DARPA is interested in both rugged, low power,
lightweight, portable displays that can be carried or even worn by individual soldiers and
very large, high information content displays for use in command posts. DARPA is also
very interested in the benefits of flat panel display technology for military aircraft. Their
impact is particularly important for surveillance aircraft such as JWACS and JSTARS
which have many displays. DARPA estimates that replacing CRT displays in these
planes with flat panel displays would improve mean time between failures (MTBF) from
500 hours to 3300 hours and save over 1000 pounds of weight. [42] DARPA funds
display-related R&D at both companies and universities. Projects are selected which
promise to provide the military with display technology that has a clear advantage over
what is commercially available.
Past DARPA-supported successes include development of the world's highest
resolution active matrix LCD (3072x2048) by Xerox. [43] This technology is intended to
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be used in the target acquisition and pilot night vision systems in the Apache attack
helicopter. Another DARPA funded innovation was a reflective LCD display that can
maintain static images after power is turned off This display is intended for mobile
applications where power consumption is a critical factor. Although DARPA has had
success with LCD-based display innovations, they have also supported research on
OLED-based displays. The potential of OLED technology to enable very lightweight,
flexible displays as well as wearable displays has been of particular interest. DARPA
grants may be a good source of early, external research money for development of the
manufacturing technology, such as inkjet printing, required to enable these OLED display
innovations.
Although DARPA sponsorship of various R&D projects has been important for
driving innovation in flat panel displays, perhaps the most visible DARPA activity in
support of the u.s. display industry has been its role in creation of the U.S. Display
Consortium (USDC) in 1993. The USDC is an industry/government partnership devoted
to maintaining a competitive flat panel industry in the United States.[44] According the
USDC web site, "USDC's technical mission is to develop the supply chain required to
enable the manufacturing of most flat panel display technology options. R&D projects
are supported for the development and commercialization of innovative new equipment
& process technology for front-end and back-end manufacturing process steps; of new
materials required to produce displays; of procured components required for display
fabrication; and for software, hardware and design analysis for factory automation and
Cllvl operation." USDC's scope is thus very similar to the original scope of Sematech,
an industry/government consortium formed in the early 1980s to help maintain a healthy,
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competitive semiconductor industry in the U.S. USDC is focused not on helping
companies get specific products to market but rather upon insuring that the U.S.
maintains a competitive domestic manufacturing infrastructure in display technology. To
. ,
date USDC has spent $lOOM on projects toward this goal.
',." .. , I
The USDC would be an ideal partner to work with on development of an inkjet-
based manufacturing tool for OLED displays. The need to improve manufacturing
capabilities for OLED displays is an excellent match with USDC' s mission to improve
domestic manufacturing infrastructure for display technology.
7. Analysis &Recommendations
This chapter has reviewed the key technology and business issues related to
evolution of the flat panel display industry. This review has brought to light interesting
opportunities for players in the traditional inkjet printing industry to capture value in the
fast growing flat panel display industry. Specifically, the promise of inexpensive,
lightweight, flexible displays based on printable OLED materials can only be fulfilled if a
reliable, low cost process technology can be developed to apply the OLED materials to
plastic substrates. Inkjet printing seems ideally suited to this task given that it is a
mature technology that has evolved to perform a similar job with traditional ink on paper.
Inkjet can generate a pattern directly from digital data and requires no pattern-
specific tooling. Further Inkjet is non-contact, which eliminates risk of contamination of
the OLED "ink" by the substrate. Finally, inkjet is a purely additive process with no
chemical waste. In spite of its maturity for traditional printing, several issues must be
addressed for inkjet to successfully evolve into a display manufacturing technology.
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7.1 Inkjet Challenges
A key question that must be answered is the degree to which inkjet can be scaled
up from a low cost, relatively low performance printing technology to a high performance
manufacturing technology. The design criteria for these two applications are quite
different. For consumer printing, dominant design criteria are print quality, cost and
:~' "
ease ofuse. For a manufacturing application the important design criteria are likely to be
speed, quality and reliability. Cost of the tool and supplies will be less important since
the printing machine tool and its supplies would be part of a high value-added
manufacturing process and would not be sold through highly competitive retail channels.
Reliability and quality will be critical to keep scrap costs low.
An early test of how well inkjet technology can scale to commercial applications
is Phogenix, a Kodak-lIP joint venture. Phogenix is a commercial photofinishing system
that generates color prints from traditional film or digital sources using inkjet rather than
silver halide technology. [10, 45] It is, however, too early to tell whether inkjet will prove
to be disruptive to traditional photofinishing technology.
Another issue which needs to be addressed IS identification of the inkjet
teclmology, piezoelectric or thermal inkjet, best suited to a display manufacturing
application. Most all work to date on inkjet printing of polymer OLEDs has focused on
use of piezoelectric inkjet, not thermal inkjet, which is the dominant inkjet technology for
consumer printing. Litrex, a subsidiary of eDT, and Seiko Epson are actively exploring
the piezo approach. Piezoelectric heads are more costly to manufacture but afford
greater flexibility in the type of fluids which can be dispensed.
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Thermal inkjet printheads are less expensive to manufacture and support higher
nozzle densities. Thermal inkjet technology is thus very well suited to consumer
printing needs but its suitability for display printing is largely unknown. In thermal
inkjet printing the material to be jetted must be capable of being boiled on the surface of
a thin film resistor. Expansion of the bubble that forms on the resistor provides the
driving force for drop ejection. This mechanism works very well for aqueous-based inks
but little is know about its performance in other solvents that may be required to dissolve
polymer OLED materials. Thermal inkjet obviously involves some heating of the fluid.
Although only a very thin film of liquid is boiled, bulk fluid temperatures can reach 50-
60C. The ability of OLED materials to withstand this kind of heating is not understood.
Further, some fluids also leave a thin film of deposits on the resistor surface as a result of
the repeated heating. These deposits, called kogation in the industry, can result in
degraded printing performance.
Exploration of the merits of thermal inkjet for display printing would require
establishment of a partnership with one or more companies currently developing soluble
OLEDs (CDT, UDC, Dow, DuPont), These firms would likely welcome interest from a
major inkjet player in strengthening the weak manufacturing stage in the value chain.
Additional funds for pursuing this research might be available in the form of a DARPA
grant; DARPA has a keen interest in the success of technologies that could enable
flexible displays. Further support might be available through USDC if the investigation
progresses towards development of a inkjet machine tool for display manufacturing.
A key business question related to the development of inkjet-based process tools
for OLED display manufacturing is one of value capture and profitability. It is well
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known that most ofth.e profi~in consu~er ittkjet prl~ting ~omes from sel1i~g the supplies
not the printers. In turn, most of the profit from the supplies co~es from the' i'nk itself
and not the cartridge. In the case of OLED supplies the inkjet companies 'would.- not be
developing and providing the OLED "ink", which is being developed by companies such
as eDT and DuPont If the consumer inkjet business model holds, much of the profit
stream from inkjet manufacturing of displays' may flo~ to the companies developing the
OLED materials and not to the companies making the process tools. The inkjet
companies could thus end up being chiefly equipment vendors and be denied much of the
profitable supplies business. The process equipment business is highly cyclical and
considerably less attractive than a supplies-driven business which derives steady revenues
from an installed base. Inkjet companies venturing into the display manufacturing
business will need to structure their alliance agreements with OLED suppliers very
carefully in order to insure capture of a fair share of the profits. As key OLED patents
expire toward the end of the decade inkjet companies may be able to begin formulating
their own OLED materials and thus increase their supplies profits.
Even if the technical and business challenges discussed above can be overcome, it
is not a given that inkjet will become the dominant process technology for display
manufacturing. The flexibility of inkjet printing with respect to pattern generation has
somewhat limited value for display manufacturing where the pattern of OLED material
on the substrate is consistently the same (repeating spots of red, green and blue). Given
this consistent pattern, a significant threat to inkjet as the deposition method of choice for
polymer GLEDs is the more traditional printing technology used 'by Toppan and Dai
Nippon to create the color filters for LCD displays. If this technology can be successfully
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adapted to print OLED materials, it, and not inkjet, could become the method for choice
for OLED display manufacture.
7.2 Adoption Accelerators
7.2.1 Casual Loop Diagram
Historical data reviewed in this chapter shows that the display industry has been
characterized by slow clockspeed or slow adoption of new technologies. The casual
loop diagram in Figure 19 shows key factors driving adoption rate of new products in the
display industry.
Key factors include product availability, product performance, product awareness,
suitability of substitutes, and price. The "chicken and egg" problem is that up-front
technology and marketing investments are required to "jump start" the Price Loop which
becomes important as adoption rate climbs and economies of scale drive cost and price
reductions. Note that there is a delay before adoption rate impacts prices; firms cannot,
therefore, wait for demand to materialize before making investments in technology and
marketing.
The casual loop diagram helps explain the importance of technology investment
by government (e.g" DARPA, US Display Consortium) in helping drive adoption rate.
The government does not require a quick or certain payback to justify its investment.
The emergence of a dominant design will also boost technology investment by focusing
investment, now spread across four competing technologies, on the one that the market
really wants.
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Figure 19: Casual Loop Diagram for Adoption Rate ofNew Dis lay Technologies
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The existence and suitability of substitutes is a very important factor. Adoption of
LeDs in large screen markets (monitors and TVs) has been slowed by the existence of a
strong substitute product (CRTs) as well as by low performance and high prices.
Adoption of LCD displays in small screen markets was much faster due to the lack of a
substitute technology. Without a substitute technology, significant adoption rate can be
realized even with higher prices and lower performance.
7.2.2 Importance of New Products
A key to accelerating the clockspeed for OLED displays will be creation of new
products where LCD displays are not good substitutes. These markets will be ones
where the OLED display attributes of brightness, video capability and low power
consumption are important and can command a price premium; recall that these are all
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areas of weakness for LCD displays. Small screen markets should be attacked first since
performance requirements (especially display lifetime) are lower and manufacturing is
easier. Adoption and acceptance of the technology in these markets will help spur
adoption of larger form factor OLED displays as the technology matures.
Figure 20 shows the production figures for products which require small flat panel
displays for 2001 and the forecast for 2004.[46] The cell phone market represents the
biggest opportunity with 80% of the demand and ten times higher volume than the next
biggest market.
Figure 20 Units (thousands)
Small Screen
Product 2001 2004E
DVD Players 20,200 34,300
Digital Still
Cameras 14,754 18,430
Camcorders 11,847 12500
Car Navigation 4100 6000
Hand-held games 12,000 16,500
PDAs 9165 13,780
Cell Phones 346,400 464.199
Ref. [46]
The first such small screen market where OLEDs displays are likely to see high
adoption rates is likely to be that for 3G cell phones. Cell phones with 3G technology
not only provide wireless phone service but also allow users to surf the web and
download games as well as music and video clips. Some phones have built-in cameras
that allow users to send still photos as well as digital video. These phones require bright,
color video-capable screens with low power requirements and are thus a very good fit for
OLED technology. At present, only Japan has significant 3G infrastructure but Europe
and the U.S. should begin to see availability over the next several years. Pricing for 3G
services is likely to be a key factor in acceptance ofthis new wireless technology.
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The portable OVD player market is also well suited for disruption by OLED
display technology. Much of the value proposition ofthese products is related to display
quality and battery life. The brightness and fast refresh rate of OLEO displays are
particularly important features for this market. Further, portable DVD players with
OLEO displays will almost certainly be able to command a significant price premium.
Handheld game products have similar display requirements to OVD players and are
another opportunity for early market entry for OLED screens. The high CPU power
consumption of handheld games makes the power efficient OLED display particularly
attractive.
In addition to cell phones, DVD players, and handheld games, entirely new
products are being developed that could take good advantage of OLEO displays. One
such example is the Lyra AudioNideo jukebox made by RCA.[47] This handheld
product, currently priced at $399, features a 3.5 inch color screen. It not only handles
music downloads but can also record up to 80 hours of programs directly from your
television. Such innovative new products will help drive adoption of OLED displays.
Penetration of OLED displays into other small screen markets such as camera and
camcorder displays and mainstream PDAs is likely to take longer. In these markets, the
display is a less important part of the product's value proposition and consumers are less
likely to be willing to pay a significant price premium for OLED displays. Displacement
of LCD displays in these markets will probably require the price of OLED displays to
decrease significantly.
OLEO penetration of the markets for larger (>10") displays is unlikely to occur
until late in the decade because the technology will simply not be ready before then. At
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present only a few prototypes of large OLED displays have been built and volume
production is some years out. Further, OLED display lifetimes must improve
significantly before they can be deployed in these markets. When laptop-size OLED
displays do become available, there adoption will depend strongly on awareness and
market acceptance of the displays in the small screen markets discussed above. If OLED
displays are successful in the small screen markets, they should be able to gain an early
toehold at the high-end of the laptop market.
For example, an OLED display would enable a super light-weight notebook with
a brilliant display and superior battery life. The new machine would dominate
competing LCD-equipped models on the important attributes of weight, display
performance and power consumption and should be able to command a significant
premIum. Another OLED-equipped high-end model might include a large screen and
built in DVD player and be tailored for multimedia and entertainment applications. As
with small screen products, adoption will depend on finding markets that value the
attributes of OLED displays and are willing to pay a premium to get them.
OLED displays are likely to eventually penetrate the market for large screen
displays (> 30'). This penetration will occur after OLED displays have a significant
presence in the medium size display market (10"-30"). In addition to price, a key
adoption driver for large OLED displays will be wide availability of broadband to the
home. Video-an-demand services, in particular, are likely to encourage purchase of
large screen displays for home theatres. The super-thin form factor of OLED displays
will allow them to be easily wall-mounted almost anywhere.
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7.3 Winners and Losers
As discussed earlier in the chapter, a dominant design for OLED displays has yet
to emerge. Which of the competing technologies is likely to emerge as the winner in the
marketplace? According to Utterback, it is doubtful that the dominant design qm be
recognized except in retrospect [40] He claims, however, that simplicity and
teclmological elegance are characteristic of many dominant designs. Although it is
impossible to be certain as to how the future of the display industry will unfold, it is
interesting to speculate on what might happen.
The small molecule OLED technology pioneered by Kodak clearly has the first-
mover advantage. Kodak has broadly licensed its technology, mostly to Asian firms
already in the display business, and products with small molecule color OLED displays
have already been introduced. This technology does, however, require complex and
costly vacuum processing and does not scale readily to low cost manufacturing using
flexible substrates and roll-to-roll processing. This shortcoming may very well prove
fatal in the highly cost-competitive display industry. Further, Kodak's partner list,
though long, does not include many highly innovative firms that could help Kodak find a
market for their technology where it does not have to compete directly with LCDs.
Low cost manufacturing is much better supported with polymer, or perhaps
dendrimer OLED materials that can be solution processed. Although these technologies
are less mature, they seem better suited to fulfilling the long-tenn potential of OLED
technology to provide very lightweight, low-cost, flexible displays. Cambridge Displays
is the leader in this area and has strong partners such as Philips and DuPont to help get its
technology to market. CDT is also partnering with both inkjet and traditional printing
Chapter 3 p.114 of 178
companies in efforts to quickly identify the best manufacturing approach. CDT's recent
acquisition of Opsys' intellectual property puts them in an excellent position to capitalize
on emerging dendrimer technology, which may have some advantages over CDT's own
polymer OLED technology_ Although CDr is a small company, their history shows that
they are very agile and business savvy. They have chosen partners carefully and
attempted to diversify their risk throughout the value chain by investing in more than one
partner or technology.
The only company likely to challenge CDT for dominance in solution-processed
OLED materials is Universal Displays. Although UDC's more mature phosphorescent
OLED technology requires a complex vapor phase deposition process, the company has
recently announced a joint development agreement with DuPont to develop new
phosphorescent OLED materials that can be soluti()n processed. If this work is
successful, UDC will have a very compelling product offering, especially since the UDC
technology is the most power efficient available_ UDC's success here might also
provide an excellent partnering opportunity for a major inkjet player. UDC currently
lacks a partner with the printing expertise required to take advantage of solution-
processed OLEDs.
It is worth noting that UDC has a small but very capable team of partners,
including Samsung, Motorola and Sony. The latter two are particular well known for
product innovation and could help UDC deploy their technology in exciting new
communication and entertainment products.
In conclusion, one can only guess at which OLED technology is likely to emerge
as the dominant design. However, the OLED technologies that can be solution
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processed are better suited' to fulfillingthe "long-temi promi'se of the technology 'and seem
. "
to better meet the criteria of simplicity and technological elegance'that often characterize
dominant designs, CDT is clearly the leader here but' UDC could pose a strong
challenge.
7.4 Strategic Recommendations
The Roberts and Berry framework discussed In Chapter 2 provides valuable
guidance to an inkjet company interested in the display manufacturing business. See
Chapter 2, Figure 12 Here the inkjet company is quite familiar with the technology but
unfamiliar with the display market. For this situation the framework suggests that a joint
venture, venture capital investment or perhaps an educational acquisition would be
appropriate strategies. Key partners for such activities would include eDT or UDC, and
perhaps, one or more of their material development partners (DuPont, Covion, Dow).
UDC is a particularly attractive partner since they are just now getting involved with
printable OLED materials and do not yet have a relationship with a major player in the
printing industry.
In these development partnerships inkjet companies will need to leverage the
strength of their complementary assets, which are chiefly their ability to develop and
manufacture inkjet printing devices. Process equipment is the Achilles heel in the value
chain for OLED displays. Companies developing and manufacturing polymer OLED
materials cannot capture value unless this material can be efficiently applied to
substrates. Although their intellectual property around the OLED material may
provide excludability, OLED companies have strong incentives to cooperate with major
inkjet players in order to get their technology to market.
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For major inkjet players to successfully exploit opportunities In display
manufacturing, they must organize for success. Christensen's framework provides
valuable guidance in this area. [48] As discussed earlie~, development of an inkjet
•. '- ,(.;.... ;
machine tool for display manufacturing is a poor fit with organizational values based on
development of consumer inkjet printers~ the important product attributes are quite
different. Such a project may, however, be a good fit with organizational processes
designed to get new products to market. In this case Christensen's framework suggests
that a heavyweight team in a separate spinout organization offers the best chance for
success. See Chapter 2, Figure 11.
7.5 Summary
The flat panel display industry is a critically important industry; its products
fundamentally impact how people work and play. Displays take data, whether for
information or for entertainment, and make it useful and accessible. Displays are thus a
critical enabling technology for a huge variety of technology products ranging from tiny
handheld devices such as PDAs, cell phones and digital cameras, up to large area
monitors, TVs, commercial displays and home theatre systems.
The display industry has historically been characterized by slow clockspeed;
innovations are slow to be commercialized and can take decades to become dominant.
Fifty-year old CRT technology still has the lion's share of the market for monitors and
TVs. CRT technology is, however, increasingly unable to meet customers' evolving
display needs. LCD displays are ubiquitous in handheld and portable devices where
CRTs simply cannot be used and are beginning to penetrate the markets where they
compete directly with CRTs. Despite its advantages, LCD technology is vulnerable due
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to its high price, poor image quality attributes th ~everal areas, and challenges in scaling
to very large screen sizes.
Display technology ba'sed on' OLEDs appears the most' likely to dlsplace'Leos.
OLEDs offer the promise of lower cost, lower power consumption, and better iinage
quality, especially for video applications. Even flexible displays appear possible. OLED
technology is, however, immature and significant technical and production issues 'must be
overcome before it will be competitive. Further, LCD manufacturers have huge
investments in manufacturing assets and are thus highly motivated to lower costs and
take advantage of strong price elasticity of demand. LCD manufacturers are fierce
competitors and will not give up easily. OLED-based displays are likely to displace
LCDs eventually but this transition could take a decade or longer_
Adoption of OLEDs can be accelerated by increased technology investment by
firms and governments as well as by introduction of new products, such as 3G cell
phones and portable DVD players, that exploit OLED's advantages over LCD displays.
Adoption ofOLED displays will increase if new markets emerge in which OLEDs do not
have to compete directly with LCDs.
There is a significant opportunity for major inkjet players to capture value in the
emerging OLED display industry. The promise of polymer or other solution-processed
OLEDs to deliver cheap, lightweight and, perhaps, flexible displays depends upon
development of a robust, low cost process technology to spray or print the material onto
substrates. A first step for inkjet firms is establishment of a working partnership with a
developer of solution-processed OLED materials. Such a partnership is critical to get
access to materials for initial R&D, which include evaluation of which inkjet technology,
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inkjet or piezo, is best suited for deposition of OLED materials. Once this decision has
been made development of a process tool can begin. This development should be
pursued by a heavyweight team in a separate spinout organization. This team must pay
careful attention to crafting the business agreement with the OLED partner to insure fair
sharing of supplies profits. Inkjet players must move quickly to capitalize on this
opportunity. eDT is already partnering with Epson on inkjet development and has
recently signed an agreement with Tappan to explore use of other printing technologies
for OLED display fabrication.
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1.1ntroduction
The amazing progress in the field of microelectronics has been well chronicled.[l]
For decades this industry has driven dramatic improvements in computing power and
enabled art enormous variety of products and services that rely on digital technology_ In
1965, Intel founder Gordon Moore predicted that the number of transistors per unit area
would double every year or 50.[2] This prediction, known as Moore's Law, has been
borne out. For almost thirty years the number of transistors per unit area has doubled
every 18 months (see Figure Figure 1).[3] The latest Pentium 4 processor from Intel has
over 42 million transistors. [4] This exponential rate of improvement in transistor density
and thus
Fi ure 1: Moore's Law
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chip performance has come at the price of high manufacturing cost and complexity.
Today's semiconductor fab costs over $IB and requires 2 weeks or more of round-the-
clock processing to complete a single circuit.[6] This heavy investment of money and
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engineering effort has lead to a wide variety of digital products, such as cell phones,
laptops and video games that pervade many aspects of our lives. This relentless march
towards ever higher circuit complexity and performance has, however, bypassed
important emerging markets for low cost electronics. These markets value cheap, even
disposable, circuits in which attributes such as large area coverage or flexible substrates
are more important than gigahertz speeds or megabyte storage densities. Products that
can take advantage of such low cost electronics include active matrix backplanes for
displays (mentioned in Chapter 3), radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags, smart
cards, solar cells, sensors, and memory. [7-10]
The key to achieving low cost electronics is development of new circuit
manufacturing technologies that do not require expensive wafer fabs with their complex
and costly lithography, implantation, and vacuum processing steps. These new circuit
manufacturing technologies have more in common with the way newspapers are made
than with traditional silicon processing. Companies are leveraging techniques such as
roll-to-roll processing and printing methods, including stamping, embossing and inkjet, to
create ultra-cheap circuits.
This chapter explores the emerging low cost electronics industry, with particular
attention paid to the potential role of inkjet as a disruptive technology. The scope of this
discussion will include review of new products and markets enabled by low cost
electronics, examination of competing technologies, a look at industry and business
dynamics, and conclude with analysis and recommendations with respect to the role of
inkjet in this industry.
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2. Product & Markets
2. 1 Radio-Frequency ID Tags
RFID tags are perhaps one of the most exciting opportunities enabled by low cost
electronics. RFID tags are tiny computer chips that function as electronic barcodes.
They store information (up to 1MB but usually much less) that can be transmitted
wirelessly to a reader that can be up to 90 feet away. Applications for RFID tags include
access, security, tracking, logistics, anti-counterfeiting, and ticketing. [11] They are
widely used for automatic toll pay on highways and tracking high-value items such as
copiers, motorcycle parts and pets.[II, 12] RFID tags are very useful for creating
unprecedented supply chain visibility. Companies can easily track parts throughout their
supply chain; a pallet or box of RFID-Iabeled parts must only pass within range of a
reader and each individual part will broadcast its unique ill to the tracking system.[13]
RFID tags are not new technology; they have existed in one form or another since
the 1930s. There are hundreds of millions already in circulation and over 500 vendors
selling RPID technology.[14] The RFID market is expected to grow to $7.5B by
2006.[14] Despite the popularity of RFID tags, their adoption in less expensive
consumer goods has been prevented by their cost. Today's silicon-based RFID tags cost
from 30 to 40 cents up to a dollar, which is too expensive for use in products such as
groceries and drug store items. Prices must drop to just a cent or two for RFID tags to
begin to replace bar codes on inexpensive products. [15] Low cost electronics is
expected to enable such price points and could eventually lead to near-universal adoption
of RFID tags on all kinds of products. The flexible, plastic substrates used for low cost
electronics will even permit their use in non-rigid products such as clothes and paper.
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Such widespread adoption of RFID tags could significantly change the way that we buy
and use products.
For example, grocery store checkout could be accomplished by simply pushing
the loaded cart by a reader; there would be no need for handling and scanning each item.
The RFID-equipped products could also communicate with appliances in the home. A
shirt could tell the washing machine what settings to use and the pizza could broadcast
the correct cooking settings to the oven. [15]
The ultimate vision is to create an "internet of things" where most all products
incorporate RPID tags and a common standard allows any reader to read any tag.[13]
Such a system would allow companies to track parts and products throughout their
lifecycle and share information over the Internet. Realizing this vision depends upon
establishment of communication standards, and, more critically, upon low cost
electronics enabling penny price points
2.2 Smart Cards
Smart cards are another market where low cost electronics could have a major
impact. Smart cards are a natural extension of the RPID tag idea. While RFID tags only
contain "hard coded" identification data, smart cards include read-write memory and
even a microprocessor. [16] Smart cards can transmit their data to a reader wirelessly
(like RFID tags) or through direct physical contact. They are used as smart credit cards
which are charged up with prepaid dollars. Each time the card is used, the smart card is
debited and the balance is written to the card's memory. Such a system with wireless
smart cards is currently in use on Washington D.C. 's subway system and will soon be
implemented on transit systems in other cities. [16] Another smart card application is to
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provide a more secure identification system for employees. The smart card can store
biometric data such as fingerprint characteristics to be used for more secure building
entry and computer access. In Europe smart cards are used to pay for phone calls. The
cards store not only balance information but also phone numbers and other personal
information that is instantly available on any card-equipped phone. Even in normal credit
card applications, smart cards offer much better data security than magnetic strips.
Merchant's favor smart card adoption as a means to reduce the $4B in annual
losses due to credit card fraud. [16] Widespread adoption of smart cards in credit card
applications is limited by the large $IIB cost of implementing smart cards, this cost
includes the cost of the smart cards themselves as well as the necessary readers and data
networks. A good chunk of this cost are the actual cards; today's smart cards cost $4 or
more vs. a few cents for a magnetic strip credit card. [16] Low cost electronics could
enable significantly cheaper cards and thus hasten their adoption beyond the current niche
markets of ill cards and subway passes.
2.3 Flexible Display Backplanes
As discussed in Chapter 3, display technology is evolving in the direction of
cheaper, thinner, and perhaps, flexible displays. New display technologies such as
organic LEDs and electronic ink permit the display material itself to be deposited on a
flexible substrate. [17] However, these new display technologies still require a matrix
backplane to drive the display. 5 Therefore, in order to achieve, an ultralight and flexible
display the matrix backplane ilS well as the display material itself must be deposited on a
flexible substrate. This need for flexible backplanes with thin film transistors capable of
5 Backplanes are discussed in some depth in Chapter 3 so the discussion here will be brief.
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controlling display pixels is a significant opportunity for low cost electronics that can be
built on plastic substrates.
2.4 Solar Cells
Another exciting opportunity for low cost electronics is fabrication of cheap,
flexible arrays of solar cells. Current energy consumption based on fossil fuels is not
sustainable in the long run and it will become increasingly important to find renewable,
nonpolluting. power sources for the future. Solar power looks like a very promising
alternative; every minute of every day the amount of solar energy that hits the earth
exceeds the world's entire annual power needs.[18] Capture of even a tiny fraction of
this energy could go a long way towards providing a steady supply of environmentally
clean energy. A major obstacle to wider use of solar power, however, is the cost of the
solar cells.
Most solar cells available today are built on expensive silicon wafers and cost per
watt is three to four times that of electricity off the grid. [18] However, it is possible to
build solar cells using much less expensive thin films of amorphous silicon or organic
semiconductors that can be coated onto flexible substrates. Further, solar cells are
relatively simple devices and do not require sophisticated circuitry. These two factors
make solar cell arrays well suited to manufacture on flexible substrates using roll-to-roll
processes.
Two startup companies, Iowa Thin Films and Konarka, have developed flexible
solar cell arrays using such processes and are competing for leadership in this emerging
market. [19-21] Their low co'st and flexibility shouid allow photovoltaic cells to be used
in many applications where they were not previously practical. For example, cheap solar
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cells could eliminate the need for batteries in portable consumer electronics as well as
camping and marine gear. In fact, Iowa Thin Films already offers a solar powered stereo
headset. [21] Cheap, flexible solar cells could also be integrated into roofing tiles and
clothing to provide environmentally friendly power at home or on the go.[20] Military
applications of solar power are particularly compelling since they could help reduce the
heavy load of batteries that the modem soldier must currently carry to power computers
and communication equipment. [21] Perhaps the most exciting emerging application of
cheap solar arrays is their potential as a clean, affordable energy source in off-grid
locations in developing countries. SELCO, a pioneering solar electric power service
company, is already working to implement such a solution in South Asia using
conventional solar cells. [22] Low cost electronics could enable much less expensive
solar cells and hasten their adoption as an energy solution in both developing and
industrialized countries.
2.5 Low Cost, Non-volatile Memory
A fifth market for low cost electronics is that for cheap, non-volatile memory.
Polymer memory is a low cost electronics technology that could become important in this
market. Polymer memory devices are not yet available but are being aggressively
developed as a cheaper alternative to non-volatile flash memory. Polymer memory cells
have a much simpler architecture than their silicon counterparts and are thus expected to
be both smaller and cheaper.[8] Unlike silicon-based memory, polymer memory can be
stacked vertically to create three dimensional arrays.[23] This extra dimension could
allow polymer memory to offer several times the storage density of silicon chips.
Although prototype polymer memory chips are currently being produced in conventional
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wafer fabs, their materials and design may eventually lend themselves to less costly
manufacturing methods, such as inkjet printing.[8]
Early markets for polymer memory are expected to be non-volatile storage for
portable digital devices, such as cell phones, PDAs, and MP3 players. Memory demand
for such appliances is expected to increase with the wider availability of broadband
internet capability which will encourage download and storage of large files (e.g., video).
[24] When polymer technology is more mature it may be able to replace hard disk drives
as the mass storage media of choice for personal computers and laptops. This
application of polymer memory would provide significant user benefit by eliminating the
time delay associated with boot up, thus enabling an "instant on" computer.
Successful penetration of the market for non-volatile memory is unlikely to be
quick or easy. The market for "new" memory technology is expected to develop slowly,
reaching only $250M by 2006; which is just 1% of the overall memory market. [24] Even
today's dominant flash memory technology took a decade to become established. Further,
there are several competing technologies which offer similar value propositions. Among
them are magnetic RAM, ferroelectric RAM, and ovonic memory. [25] Newer
technologies based on carbon nanotubes and molecular electronics are also targeting this
market. [26, 27]
Low cost electronics technology is poised to disrupt a variety of markets. In
general, these markets value low cost and a flexible form factor rather than speed and
performance. These compelling attributes of low cost electronics stem directly from a
radicalIy different manufacturing approach that has more in common with printing than
with traditional silicon circuit manufacturing. This approach allows circuits to be used
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in new ways that are simply not practical with traditional silicon technology. The next
section examines the different technologies being developed to take advantage of the
significant opportunities in low cost electronics.
3. Technology
Several different technologies are being developed to create circuits for low cost
electronics markets. These range from those that leverage silicon chip technology, either
by embedding traditional silicon chips in plastic substrates or applying silicon processing
steps on plastic films, to those that use printing technologies to create organic or
inorganic thin film transistors. A key factor in evaluating and understanding these
technologies is the carrier (either electrons or holes) mobility that can be achieved.
Carrier mobility is the speed that an electron or hole moves through a material in the
presence of an electric field and is directly related to the maximum possible operating
frequency of a transistor. Units for electron mobility are cm2 IV-s. Figure 2 compares
the carrier mobility of single crystal silicon to that for several low cost electronics
technologies. Note that low cost electronics technologies do not enable the high electron
mobilities possible with single crystal silicon and thus are not suitable for building high
performance chips, CPUs or high-speed memory.
3. 1 Embedded Silicon
The low cost electronics technology that is most similar to that used for traditional
silicon circuits is Alien Technologies embedded silicon process. [28, 29] Alien is initially
targeting the RFID tag market, but the technology can be used in other applications such
as display backplanes. Alien's approach involves fabricating tiny chips, called
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Nanoblocks, in a traditional silicon wafer fab. These chips range in size from tens to
hundreds of microns across. Once the wafer processing has been completed the
individual chips are separated from the wafer by wet chemical etching rather than
precision sawing. This wet etch approach creates smooth beveled edges on the chips,
which makes the dice look like tiny pYramids. The separated dice are then suspended in
a liquid which is flowed over plastic webbing, which is handled with reel-to-reel
equipment. The plastic webbing is pre-notched with holes that are the same shape as the
tiny chips; the chips drop into these holes in the correct orientation as the liquid flows
over the webbing. This approach, which Alien terms Fluidic Self-Assembly (FSA),
allows accurate placement of thousands ofNanoblocks per second. Any unused chips are
simply recycled and used to flow over another substrate
Fi ure 2: Char e Carrier Mobilities
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Once a substrate is fully-populated with chips, a polymer film is laminated onto
the chip-embedded substrate to hold the Nanoblocks in place. Via holes etched through
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this top layer and screen printed conductor traces are added to provide electrical
connections to chips.
Alien's approach has the important advantage of separating fabrication of the
circuit from that of the substrate. This approach avoids the significant challenge of trying
to fabricate circuits directly onto flexible substrates. Instead, Alien's chips are generated
in foundry fabs with well-characterized CMOS processes. The chips are very small and
relatively simple (a few thousand transistors); yields and die per wafer are thus high and
die costs low. Use of standard CMOS processing on silicon wafers also means that
applications of FSA technology are not limited by carrier mobility (see Figure 2).
Further, the chips can be tested prior to separation from the wafer so post-assembly yield
loss is minimized. Since the circuits are not fabricated directly on the plastic substrates
the reel processing is relatively simple; e.g., the plastic substrate is not exposed to
vacuum or high temperature conditions.
Alien already has a prototype process up and running that can produce 250,000
parts per hour on a 6 inch wide web of plastic. Plans for a line that can produce 2
million units per hours are in the works. Alien expects their approach to enable a 5 cent
price point for RFID tags. Overall, Alien's FSA technology seems very compelling. It
minimizes risk and invention by leveraging well-understood silicon technology while still
taking advantage of the efficiencies of continuous roll-to-ro11 processing. Reliance of
silicon technology, however, rules out the possibility of quick and easy design changes or
the possibility of desktop or very small-scale fabrication.
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3.2 Polysilicon TFT on Plastic
Two companies, Flexics and Rolltronics, are pursuing low cost electronics
technology that involves fabrication of polysilicon thin film transistors (TFTs) directly
onto plastic substrates.[30-32] Polysilicon mobilities are around 60 cm2N -s, enabling
fabrication of all but the highest performance solid state circuits. [31] The technology
used by both companies is licensed from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.
[33] Flexics founders include scientists who developed the technology while at
Lawrence Livermore. [34]
Like Alien's embedded silicon process, the polysilcon TFT technology leverages
well-understood wafer fab processes. Figure 3 shows the Flexics device, which is based
on standard CMOS processes. The key difference is that the polysilicon TFT approach
Fi re 3: Flexics Device
Source: Ref. [32]
involves fabrication of active devices directly on a plastic substrate. A key challenge
here is forming the high mobility polysilicon material while keeping the plastic substrate
at a temperature of less than 100C.[32] Low temperature polysilicon processes
developed for use on silicon wafers involve process steps with temperatures of 300-400C
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and are thus not suitable for use with plastic substrates. The polysilicon on plastic
process involves several process changes to avoid exposing the plastic substrate to high
temperature. A key process difference is the use of a laser to fonn the polysilicon film
required for the devices. The laser results in local heating of the silicon film to over
IsOaC for about 1 microsecond, which is sufficient for it to melt and recrystallize to form
higher mobility polysilicon. The short laser pulse and insulating silicon oxide film
between the silicon film and substrate prevent damage to the plastic.
Flexics initial target market for their polysilicon on plastic technology is flexible
backplanes for displays. They aim to develop a plug-compatible flexible backplane that
display manufacturers can easily use instead of the standard glass backplanes.[34] Such
plastic backplanes will make current LCD displays cheaper, lighter, thinner, and more
rugged and will also be suitable for use with electronic ink or organic LED display
materials to create flexible displays. Later markets for Flexics may include memory
modules and optical component integration. [34]
Flexics plans to manufacture their products using roll-to-roll processing. Process
development to enable this approach is currently underway. Meanwhile plastic substrate
prototypes are being built on wafer-shaped substrates using standard batch-based fab
equipment. [33]
Rolltronics, on the other hand, has already demonstrated the ability to
manufacture transistors on plastic using roll-to-roll processing. [30, 35] This feat was
accomplished in partnership with Iowa Thin Films, which has significant expertise in reel
processing of flexible electronics from their core solar cell array business. [36]
Rolltronics is planning to invest $100M in a fab capable of generating 1a feet of plastic
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circuits per minute. They are 'h~p'ing to begin ~ass production of plastic cODlponents as
soon as next year. Like Flexics,' Rolltronics is targeting the display backplane market
. . -,. .
and expects to capture market share based on costs that are 5 to 10 times lower than those
for glass backplanes.[36] Rolltronics also has' their eye on opportunities in the RFID and
sensor markets, where they expect demand for low-cost, moderate-speed, flexible logic
circuits.
Overall, the polysilicon TFT on plastic technology looks promising. Many of the
process steps are very similar to those' used in fabrication of CMOS devices in a wafer
fab. Further, process innovations that permit low temperature processing on plastic have
been demonstrated. The lower mobility ofpolysilicon versus single crystal single silicon
means that the polysilicon device performance will not be as good as that possible with
Alien's embedded silicon process. It is, however, much better than that possible with
organic or amorphous silicon transistors and is good enough for a wide variety of
applications. See Figure 2. Since the polysilicon process still relies on traditional
lithography methods to pattern films, design changes require fabrication of new
photomasks and thus cannot be done quickly.
3.3 Organic Thin Film Transistors (OTFTs)
Several companies are working to develop transistors using organIC
semiconductor materials.. This approach is a more significant departure from standard
silicon processing than either the embedded silicon or the polysilicon TFT technologies.
Rather than taking advantage of the well-understood semiconducting properties of
silicon, organic thin film transistors (OTFTs) rely on semiconducting organic material.
The advantage of this approach is that the tricky problem of figuring out how to combine
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silicon with plastic is entirely avoided. The organic semiconductor material can be
applied directly to the substrate with simple methods such as inkjet printing or stamping.
Organic TFT technology is very well suited to applications where low cost and large area
coverage are important.[IO] Further, OTFT fabrication can be accomplished at low
temperature and is thus compatible with plastic substrates. A drawback of OTFTs is
their relatively low performance. This low performance results from low charge carrier
mobilities, which typically range from 0.01 to 1 cm2N.s (see Figure 2), and relatively
coarse device geometries. Typical gate lengths for OTFTs are 5·10 microns, 40 or more
times larger than gate lengths possible with silicon processing. [37]
Most all organic semiconducting materials are p-type and the charge carriers are
holes, rather than electrons. [38] From an applications perspective it would be desirable
to also have n-type organic semiconductors. Use of the both n-type and p-type organic
semiconductors would enable fabrication of p-n junctions, inverters and more power-
efficient CMOS circuits. Research into n-type organic semiconductors has shown them
to be unstable and very susceptible to reaction with air and water- These problems will
probably eventually be solved but initial products based on OTFTs will almost certainly
be based on p-type devices. One way around, the problem of building organic CMOS
circuits is to combine organic and inorganic (e.g, amorphous silicon) transistors. [39]
However, this approach adds process complexity.
Like organic LEDs, organic semiconductor materials are of two basic types, small
molecule and polymer.[17] Small molecule materials such ~i's pentacene exhibit higher
mobilities (as high as 1-2 cm2 N-s, see Figure 2) but can only be applied to substrates
using vacuum deposition processes. P01ymer semiconductors can be solution processed;
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that is they can dissolved in liquids such as xylene or toluene and applied to substrates
using printing methods such as stamping or inkjet. [40] Mobilities of the polymer
materials are, however, only one-tenth or less of those possible with small molecule
materials.
One of the major players in development of polymer-based OTFTs is Plastic
Logic, based in Cambridge, U. K. [41] Plastic Logic is developing all polymer
transistors that can be built almost entirely by inkjet printing.[42] Inkjet is used to
deposit conducting, insulating and semiconducting polymers as well as to create via hole
connections. The only step that relies on traditional lithography is patterning of a thin
hydrophobic polyimide film that sits on the plastic substrate. This film is needed to limit
spreading of the drops of conductive polymer used to create the source and drain. A
diagram of Plastic Logic's all-polymer transistor is shown in Figure 4.
There are two key advantages to this entirely printed device structure. First of all,
most of the expensive equipment required in a wafer fab for patterning and etching thin
films is not necessary. The capital cost for a manufacturing facility for polymer-based
circuits are expected to be only 30-35% of that for a silicon wafer fab.[lO, 43] Operating
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costs are also expected to be lower. This cost structure should allow Plastic Logic
products to compete at very low price points. The second important advantage of entirely
printed devices is design flexibility. Since there are no photomasks to modify, circuit
designs can be modified simply by changing the data file used to generate the printing
pattern. The economical build quantity for a unique circuit is thus very small, perhaps
even one. The ability to easily make design changes is advantageous for quick
prototyping as well for mass customization of products.
The major drawback to Plastic Logic's all-polymer transistor technology is the
inherently low performance of polymer semiconductor materials. Polymer transistors
are competition only for amorphous silicon, not crystalline silicon technology. Plastic
Logic's first target applications are RFID tags and backplanes for niche LCD displays
and electronic paper. [43] A small active matrix backplane prototype with 4800 gates has
been demonstrated but real product revenue is not expected until 2005. Further in the
future Plastic Logic plans to deploy their technology in markets for sensors, memory and
smart cards. Long term aspirations are ASICs and backplanes for high performance
OLED displays; success in these markets will likely require a different technology.
Plastic Logic is unsure of their long-term business model. Possibilities include
licensing, sales of process equipment or limited manufacturing. The company plans to let
customers drive them to the right business model.
Philips is also working on development of all-polymer transistors. Their devices
are built using spin coating and lithography rather than inkjet printing. [44, 45] Although
lithography is undesirable from a cost perspective, only three photomasks are required to
make a transistor. Philips has experimented with both top and bottom gate designs (see
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Figure 5). The top gate designs were used with a polymer semiconductor and resulted in
mobilities of about 0.001 cm2 N-s.[44] The bottom gate designs were compatible with
higher mobilitY pentacene (small molecule) material which improved mobilities by a
factor of 10.
An unusual aspect of both designs is the use of conductive polyaniline films for
the gate and source/drain layers. This material's resistance increases dramatically (11
orders of magnitude) upon UV light exposure. Philips exposes the entire circuit except
the gate or source/drain regions, which remain conductive. There is no need to remove
material after the UV exposure step. Philips calls this technique for generating
conductive and insulating areas in the same film photochemical patterning.
Philips has demonstrated functional integrated circuits on plastic with over 300
gates using both their top and bottom gate approaches.[44, 45] The Philips work on
OTFTs has been within the central research lab; the company's plans for
commercializing this technology are not clear.
Figure 5: Top and Bottom Gate Designs
Bottom Gate
Plastic Substrate
Adapted from Ref. [45]
Top Gate
Plastic Substrate
Another major player in OTFTs is Bell Labs, now part of Lucent. Scientists at
Bell Labs are using microcontact printing, rather than inkjet or lithography to build their
devices. Microcontact printing, first developed at Harvard, relies on a rubber stamp that
is made by first creating a master by patterning and etching a silicon wafer with the
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required pattern using high resolution lithography. [46] Silicone rubber is then poured
over the master to create a high resolution stamp. Although lithography is required to
make the master, the resulting stamp can be reused many times to create thousands of
circuits. [37]
The Bell Labs devices use a bottom gate configuration (see Figure 5). A low
resolution stamp is used to pattern a gate layer of indium tin oxide which sits on the
plastic substrate. An insulating layer is then deposited to cover the gate. The next step,
patterning of the source and drain electrodes, is a critical step and requires a high
resolution stamp. The separation of these electrodes must be 15 microns or less to
guarantee adequate device performance. The source and drain electrodes are made of
gold, which must be deposited in a vacuum system. Gold was chosen because it can be
stamped with a special chemical ink (hexadecanthiol), which forms a protective
monolayer on the gold surface where the source and drain electrodes will be. The
unstamped areas are then etched away to complete formation of the electrodes. Finally a
layer of semiconducting polymer is spin cast on top. Bell Labs has demonstrated
mobilities of 0.1-0.5 cm2 N-s with this approach.
Bell Labs is targeting active matrix backplanes for electronic paper as an initial
application of their technology. [47] They are partnering with electronic paper display
maker E-Ink in this effort. [48] The two companies have demonstrated a 1 mm thick, 6
inch square display (256 pixels) using the Bell Labs OTFT technology. This display is 1 4
the size and weight of an LCD display of comparable size. [49] Electronic paper is a
good early application for OTFTs since it does not require high refresh rates and does not
need fast-switching transistors to control the pixels.
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ffiM, Xerox and Siemens are also conducting research in OTFTs, but have not yet
demonstrated prototype circuits or announced plans for commercialization. This
research is focused chiefly on engineering of the organic semiconductor layer to achieve
better stability and higher performance (mobility). There is also significant university
research in OTFT development. Universities with active research programs in this area
include UCLJ\ Penn State, and the University of Arizona.
3.4 AI/Inorganic Transistors
Organic TFTs are clearly an important low cost electronics technology and have
been the focus of work at several companies_ One startup company, Kovio, is exploring
an alternative low cost electronics approach based on all-inorganic printable materials.
Kovio is a Silicon Valley startup employing nanoparticle ink technology developed at
lVIIT's Media Lab. [50] The chief advantage of Kovio's printed electronics technology is
the higher mobilities possible with inorganic semiconductor materials. Research at MIT
has demonstrated mobilities for printed inorganic devices ofup to 1 cm2N ~s, an order of
magnitude higher than mobilities possible with printable (polymer) organic
semiconductors. [51] Inorganic semiconductors (Si, Ge, GaAs) are the basis for most all
high performance microelectronics and have intrinsic mobilities of 1000 cm2 N -so
Kovio's approach thus offers the possibility of printable electronics with sufficient
performance for applications such as microprocessors. Printable inorganics may make
the vision of a desktop fab where you can download and print your own circuits a reality.
[6, 52]
Inorganic materials are typically not soluble in liquids suitable for printing, The
l\1IT innovation that makes printing inorganic materials possible is based on solutions of
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cadmium selenide nanocrystals. The nanocrystals are suspended in a solvent and printed
onto a substrate. Nanocrystals have the unusual property of melting points that are as
much as IOOOC lower than bulk material. Thus a short sintering period at 350C is
sufficient to tum the nanocrystals into a robust polycrystalline film. A diagram of the
MIT device is shown in Figure 6. Although the initial nanocrystal work has been done
with cadmium selenide, the general approach should be applicable to a wide variety of
other semiconductor materials (Si, Ge, GaAs, etc. ).
Figure 6: Inorganic Thin Film Transistor
Ref [51]
There is little public information available on Kovio. They have thus far raised
over $IOM and count Vinod Khosla, a well-known venture capitalist, among their
investors. [53, 54] Early markets are likely to include RFID tags and display backplanes.
3.5 Memory and Solar Cells
Polymer memory and solar cells are both simple types of devices and do not require
fabrication of transistors. Solar cells are basically diodes, built with layers of p-type and
n-type semiconductor material, that are sandwiched in-between a pair of electrodes [55]
See Figure 7. Incoming photons strike the n-type material and create electron-hole pairs.
The electrons and holes move under the electric field provided by the diode to create
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current flow. Iowa Thin Films uses doped amorphous silicon layers deposited on plastic
films to create their solar cell products. Konarka, meanwhile, uses semiconducting
titanium dioxide nanoparticles coated with a light-sensitive dye. Although these
approaches do lend themselves to use with flexible substrates, these materials are not
well-suited to printing-based manufacturing.
Fi ure 7: Solar Cell
p"oton.'~
Ref. [55]
One emerging approach which may enable such low cost production is use of
organic materials to make solar cells. [18] Organic LED and organic semiconductor
materials can both be used to create solar cells. Some of these materials can be solution
processed and could be applied with printing methods. The simple architecture of solar
cells makes printing a particularly compelling manufacturing approach. Development of
organic solar cell materials is, however, in the early stages. Efficiencies are only a few
percent versus 15% or better with inorganic materials and there are significant issues with
material degradation in the presence of oxygen. [18] Companies working on
development of organic LED displays (e.g., Cambridge Display Technologies, DuPont)
are beginning to explore the possibilities of organic solar cells. Konarka is also moving
into this area with their recent acquisition of an Austrian company developing organic
photovoltaics. [56]
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Like solar cells, polymer memory cells are simple devices that do requIre
fabrication of transistors. Polymer memory simply consists of pillars of polymer material
sandwiched in between perpendicular arrays of conductor lines (see Figure 8). [8, 24]
Polymer memory has the potential to be 10-15 times cheaper than conventional silicon
due to its simpler architecture.
Fi ure 8: Polymer Memory
POLYMER MEMORY
Ref. [8]
The secret to polymer memory lies in the bistable nature of the polymer itself.
Polymers used in memory applications can be switched between two stable states by
application of an electric field. These two states permit storage of binary data; their
stability means that either state persists even after electrical power is removed. Polymer
memory is thus non-volatile like today's flash memory.
A polymer memory concept being developed by Coatue, a Boston-based startup
with backing from Advanced Micro Devices, relies on a change in the electrical
resistance of the polymer. In the Coatue device, the configuration of the polymer
changes upon application of an electric field to a polymer pillar memory cell, resulting in
a decrease in its electrical resistance. When an opposite field is applied the polymer
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switches back to its higher resistance configUration. The polymer is thus bistable and
data can be stored based on these two different conductivity states.
Another polymer memory approach, being pursed by Thin Film Electronics, a
Swedish R&D firm entirely owned by Intel and Opticom ASA, is based on ferroelectric
polymers. [24] Here the polarity of the polymer rather than its resistance changes with
application of an electric field. Again the polarity states are stable, permitting non-
volatile storage of binary data.
Polymer memory is not yet on the market and current development relies on
conventional wafer fab,t~~hnology. However, the simple device architecture and use of a
polymer film as the m~m?rymaterial offers the future possibility of lower cost solution-
based processing for a least part of the fabrication process. [8] Another exciting
possibility is the potential for three dimensional memory arrays. [8] The cross-bar
structure is quite simple and very thin so it may be possible to create mulit-Ievel arrays
with very high storage capacities.
The potential of polymer memory has attracted the intention of major integrated
circuit companies. As noted earlier, both Intel and Al.VID are investing in small firms
developing polymer memory. [24] The interest of these major seminconductor players is
a significant vote of confidence in this emerging technology.
3.6 Technology Dynamics
Low cost electronics seems to fit Christensen's definition of a disruptive
technology. It has lower cost and lower performance than the mainstream silicon
technology and' is targeting markets that are not accessible to silicon technology Silicon
technology is simply not economical for very low cost or large area applications. In
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several markets, such as penny RFID tags or flexible display backplanes, low cost
electronics is competing against non-consumption. Addressing latent needs in unserved
markets is often a successful strategy for disruptive technologies. Christensen predicts
that a disruptive technology will gain a beachhead in low cost and low performance
applications and then move up market to displace the incumbent technology in
mainstream applications. In the case of low cost electronics, this part of Chirstensen' s
model seems unlikely to be fulfilled. With the possible exception of printable inorganic
transistors, low cost electronics technologies will never have the capability to compete
with silicon in high performance integrated circuit applications. These technologies will
co-exist with and complement rather than displace silicon technology by enabling use of
circuits in low cost or even disposable products. Low cost electronics is a disruptive
technology that is likely to he successful due to its ability to create new, previously
unaddressed markets rather than its ability to outperform the incumbent technology in
existing applications.
4. Industry Structure
4.. 1 Value Chain & Industry Structure
The value chain for the low cost electronics industry is shown in Figure 9. The
participation of firms across this value chain is summarized in Figure 10. The industry
structure is an interesting mix of startups and large, high-tech companies. The large
companies are mostly focused on R&D related to development of novel transistor
structures that can be cheaply manufactured on flexible substrates. Some small
companies (Kovio, Plastic Logic) are also focused in this area. These efforts are
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unlikely to result In products for several years. Other small companies (Alien,
Rolltronics, Flexics) are working to get products to market sooner by adapting well-
understood silicon technology for use in low cost roll-to-roll manufacturing.
Fi ure 9: Low Cost Electronics Industry Value Chain
Fi ure 10
Equipment Product
endors Mt.
Distri-
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A clear sign of the immaturity of this industry is the heavy concentration of firms
in the R&D stage of the value chain and the relatively low participation in other stages.
Of all the players, only Iowa Thin Films, with its flexible solar cell arrays, currently has a
true low cost electronics product on the market.
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Dow appears to be the only major chemical company currently working on low
cost electronics materials. It is likely that other chemical companies will get involved as
R&D efforts come to fruition and companies seek partners to help them scale up for mass
production. Companies, such as Alien, Flexics and Rolltronics, which are leveraging
wafer fab processes, can get the materials they need for manufacturing from the same
sources as the semiconductor industry.
There are two significant players in the equipment vendor stage of the value
chain. Iowa Thin Films has emerged as a leader in the development of roll-to-roll
processing equipment for low cost electronics. They are using this equipment to produce
their low cost solar arrays and are also partnering with Rolltronics to provide them with
equipment for manufacture of polysilicon transistors on plastic. Seiko Epson, a major
manufacturer of piezoelectric-based ink jet printers, is working with Plastic Logic. [57]
This partnership should give Epson a head start in developing inkjet-based machine tools
for printing circuits. Another potential equipment player is Litrex, a subsidiary of
Cambridge Display Technologies, which makes inkjet-based machine tools for
manufacture of OLED displays. Presumably their equipment, which is capable ofjetting
solutions of OLED polymers, could also handle organic electronic materials for circuit
manufacturing.
Companies that have already commercialized their low cost electronics
teclmology (Iowa Thin Films) or will soon do so (Flexics, Rolltronics, Alien) are
choosing to do their own manufacturing. They evidently believe that their tacit
knowledge of manufacturing processes is an important source of competitive advantage.
Further, since reel processing of electronics is entirely new there are few if any existing
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companies capable of handle this manufacturing on an outsource basis. The production
strategy for the most of the companies that are currently involved only in R&D activities
related to low cost electronics is unclear. Smaller companies such as Plastic Logic or
Konarka may choose to license their technology, or at least outsource manufacturing, to
bigger companies able to make large infrastructure investments. Larger companies such
as ffiM or Siemens could afford a vertically integrated approach to entering low cost
electronics markets~ at this point, however, it is not clear how they plan to try to
capitalize on their R&D investments. One exception is Lucent's Bell Labs, which is
partnering with EInk, to create flexible displays based on electronic ink technology.
The integration stage of the value chain is probably only important for display
backplanes. In this case the backplane is a component of a complex display product and,
with the exception of Philips, firms in the low cost electronics industry are not in the
display business. Firms targeting this market will almost certainly sell their backplanes
to display companies who will build display modules for use in cell phones, PDAs,
laptops and desktop monitors. So far, only Lucent has announced a display partner.
Other low cost electronics products, such as RFID tags, smart cards, and solar cells, do
not require significant further manufacturing before they can be sold to customers. For
these products it is likely that the company doing the product manufacturing will also do
the necessary integration to create a final, saleable product.
The final stage ofthe value chain is distribution. Since most low cost electronics
products have yet to reach the market, distribution channels have yet to be developed.
Display backplanes, which must be integrated into displays to have value, will certainly
be sold through existing display distribution channels. Iowa Thin Films is distributing its
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solar cell products through a small number of vendors that specialize in solar and other
environmentally friendly products.
4.2 Alliance &Partnerships
The low cost electronics industry is characterized by a relatively small number of
alliances. See Figure 11. This situation is in sharp contrast to the OLED industry
discussed in Chapter 3 where there is a complex web of inter-company relationships.
This lack of partnerships is somewhat surprising given the complexity ofdeveloping new
electronics technologies, especially those that involve invention of new organic or
inorganic transistors. This development work requires expertise in several diverse areas
including chemical synthesis, device physics and novel manufacturing methods; few
companies~ especially smaller ones, have strong competencies in all of these areas. The
small number ofpartnerships to date is perhaps another sign of the industry's immaturity.
With most companies still focused on R&D the pressure· to form partnerships is
somewhat limited. As new cost electronics technologies mature, look for an increase in
the number of partnerships as the players seek the means to bring the products to market
and to begin to recover their substantial development investment.
Figure 11: Industry Partnerships
Company Partners
Plastic Logic Epson Dow
Bell Labs Eink
Rolltronics Iowa TF
Coatue ~MD
Thin Film Electronics Intel
Xerox Dow Motorola
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4.3 Competitive Attributes
The primary adoption drivers for low cost electronics are expected to be flexible
form factor, and, of course, cost. In some applications, such as flexible displays and
penny RFID tags, the new technologies are creating entirely new markets. These
products are simply not possible with existing technologies. In other markets, such as
solar cells and memory, the new low cost technologies must compete with existing
products on the basis of price and performance. The grid in Figure 12 shows predicted
market entry dynamics for low cost electronics technologies based on the cost and
performance versus amorphous silicon technology.
New low cost electronics technologies are expected to displace amorphous silicon
in cases where they deliver the same or higher performance at lower cost or higher
performance at the same cost. In these cases low cost electronics would be expected to
displace incumbent amorphous silicon technology even in products such as desktop
monitors, where the flexible form factor is not highly valued.
Figure 12
Performance vs. a-Si
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In cases where the flexible form factor of low cost electronics technologies is
valued the new technologies may be adopted even if cost and performance are the same.
Adoption is also possible when performance and cost are lower than amorphous silicon,
provided that performance is still good enough to get the job done.
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5. Analysis and Recommendations
5.1 Winners and Losers
It is rather early to make high confidence predictions as which firms and
technologies will prevail in the emerging markets for low cost electronics. Since success
in these markets is largely cost-driven the dominant design may not be the first one to
market but instead the one with lowest price. It is also unclear as to which of the various
potential markets for the technologies will become the most important.
In this high uncertainty environment, Alien Technology's approach looks
compelling. Heavily leveraging existing silicon circuit technology allows them to
address a wide range of product applications from higher performance display backplanes
and smart cards to lower performance RFID tags. Further this strategy allows them to
focus their resources on developing the new rol1~to-roll processes for manufacturing
circuits rather than inventing new solid state devices. This approach minimizes risk and
should provide a time-to-market advantage. Alien's embedded silicon approach may,
however, not ultimately be the cheapest of the various low cost electronics technologies.
The polysilicon TFT on plastic technology being developed by Rolltronics and
Flexics completely avoids wafer fab processing and thus has the potential to be cheaper
than Alien's embedded silicon technology. Performance is lower than that possible with
Alien's approach but is still more than adequate for most all low cost applications. There
is also more risk with the polysilicon approach since significant process innovation is
required to build transistors on flexible substrates using fab-like processes.
The organic and inorganic transistor technologies are higher risk still. These
technologies require invention and characterization of entirely new transistors built from
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unconventional materials; much R&D work remains to be done before these technologies
can be commercialized. Standards for these new devices do not yet exist, although the
IEEE has begun work in this area for organic TFTs. [17] New high yield, high capacity
manufacturing processes must also be developed that can apply these materials to
substrates. Further, the partnerships and channels required to bring these new products
to market have also yet to be created. An additional risk for the organic TFT
technologies, especially those based on semiconducting polymers, is that performance
currently falls short of amorphous silicon and they may thus only be suitable for the
lowest performance applications. This risk does not seem to exist for Kovio' s printable
inorganic transistor technology, which appears capable of least amorphous silicon
performance. [51] Kovio could be a clear winner if their technology can deliver
performance equivalent to or better than polysilicon FETs.
Fi re 13: Performance vs. Cost
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In spite of these challenges, the new transistor technologies should offer the
lowest cost means for production of active circuits. A manufacturing approach based on
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printing, rather than lithography, also offers the flexibility to make quick design changes
and, perhaps, mass customize products.
Figure 13 summarizes the risk, performance and cost characteristics of the
competing low cost electronics technologies.
5.2 InkJet Challenges
Inkjet clearly has the potential t6 be an important' enabling technology for low
cost applications. There are, however, a number of challenges related to using inkjet to
print circuit materials. For example, inkjet can only be used for organic and inorganic
materials that can solution-processed. In the case of organic materials, only the polymer
materials meet this requirement. These materials have lower mobilities than amorphous
silicon so product application may be limited to the least demanding applications such as
RFID tags and electronic ink displays. This may not be an issue as long as these markets
are sufficiently large and profitable. The ability to move up market is, however, limited.
Another issue for inkjet is that solutions of organic polymers can ·be difficulf··to
dispense. Solvents such as xylene and toluene are often required to dissolve the organic
semiconducting polymers. [40] These solvents may attack polymer materials used to
build the inkjet printheads. Also such organic solvents are quite volatile and can
evaporate in the inkjet nozzles leading to clogging problems. [40] Difficulties jetting
circuit materials led a Xerox team to investigate inkjet as a means of creating resist
patterns instead. [40] This approach requires conventional means for deposition and
etching of thin films but still avoids use ofphotomasks.
Much of the R&D work on use of inkjet to dispense circuit materials has been
based on use of just a single nozzle. Although this approach is simpler for experimental
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purposes it is not practical from a manufacturing perspective. Reasonable manufacturing
throughput can only be achieved with use of multiple nozzles. Once nozzle arrays are
1;,1'" ~ ... ,-",,~••. ~,.,_b.i{~-i:\ ...~-'~ ......:\.1 ,. -"~I'. \ j '., '. '. ,.:.~
employed, however, it is necessary to take additional care to minimize nozzle variability
and to make sure all nozzles are functioning properly. An additional throughput
challenge is that optimal deposition conditions may require considerable delays between
subsequent drops. If adjacent drops are printed too quickly, surface tension may cause a
string ofunconnected dots, rather than a line, to be formed on the substrate.[40] A delay
between drops provides time for solvent evaporation and helps to guarantee formation of
a continuous line of material; there is, however, an obvious throughput impact
Accurate control of the position and size of circuit features is another challenge
for inkjet printed electronics. Due to the low mobilities of printable semiconductor
materials it is important to achieve channel lengths of 10 microns or less in order to
realize reasonable device perfonnance. Such dimensions are challenging for inkjet since
factors such as angular misalignment of the printhead, thermal expansion of the printhead
and drop velocity variation all contribute to dot placement error. [40] Once the droplet
hits the substrate liquid spreading contributes to further variation. Local alignment of the
printhead to circuit features can help minimize dot placement error. Control of liquid
spreading, on the other hand, typically requires additional features on the substrate to
contain the liquid. An example of this approach is the patterned polyimide layer
employed by Plastic Logic. [42, 43] Laser machining of trenches for the ink might be
another approach.
It is important to note that all the published work to date on inkjet printing of
circuit materials has utilized piezoelectric, not thermal, inkjet printheads. Piezoelectric
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heads rely on physical movement of a membrane to achieve drop ejection rather than
expansion of a bubble created by boiling a thin film of liquid with a tiny resistor. Piezo
technology is believed to be able to jet a wider range of material than is possible with
thermal inkjet due to the lack of thermal effects. There is however, no published data to
establish that thermal inkjet is not suitable for printing circuit materials.
5..3 Inkjet Recommendations
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production of cheap, reliable circuits. Application of inkjet printing to construction of
low cost circuits is an entirely different design challenge than building a low cost
consumer printer. The product requirements for a circuit printer are those of a high
precision machine tool not a $99 consumer electronics product. It is not important that
the circuit printer itself be inexpensive but rather that it be engineered to produce
inexpensive circuits.
This strong difference in product requirements between consumer printers and
circuit printers suggests that development work should proceed within a focused
heavyweight team that is somewhat separated from core business activities. [58] A heavy
weight team alone, however, is probably insufficient for success. Even though inkjet
companies are familiar with the technology they are not familiar with low cost electronics
markets. A joint venture, alliance or acquisition may be necessary to acquire the needed
market understanding. [59] Additional licensing efforts may also be required to obtain
the rights to use promising, patented processes or materials.
The best chance for existing inkjet companies to capture value in the emerging
low cost electronics industries may be to think more broadly about their competencies.
Inkjet companies excel at mass production and testing of cheap, reliable yet complex
electronic components (inkjet printheads). Hewlett-Packard, which integrates printheads
into its ink supplies, is already in the disposable electronics business. Inkjet companies
,.' . , , ,: ~ ,
may not need to figure out how to inkjet print circuits in order to become important
players in low cost electronics. They may be better o~ .applying their strong skills in
designing low cost printhead~ to develop n~~. an~ better technologies for creating low
cost electronics.
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1. Summary
Inkjet has clearly been a disruptive technology for traditional printing. This thesis
has endeavored to examine the potential of inkjet technology to become a disruptive
technology in other industries, specifically displays and low cost electronics. The very
attributes of inkjet that have made it such an important printing technology also make it
compelling in other applications. Inkjet excels at depositing picoliter quantities of liquid
on a substrate with very high precision and at very low cost.
Traditionally the ink has beehaqueous 'solutions of dye or pigment, the' substrate
has been paper, and the result has been black and white and color documents or even
photographs. However, when the "ink" becomes electronics materials such as light-
emitting polymers or semiconducting organic compounds and the substrate becomes
plastic the result can be low cost, flexible displays and circuits. Inkjet is a purely additive
technology and thus avoids the need for the expensive lithography and vacuum
processing steps usually required to pattern thin films. Further, since inkjet directly
writes the desired pattern for the display or circuit, there is no need for expensive
photomasks. Economic build quantities are thus small and design changes can be made
easily. The simplicity of printing circuits or displays versus the complexity of traditional
manufacturing means that capital costs for an inkjet-based manufacturing facility could
be as little as 1/3 of the $I-2B cost oftoday's wafer and flat panel display fabs.
The promise of inkjet as an electronics manufacturing technology is great. It
seems to drive all the important business factors in the right direction; i. e., lower capital
cost, lower variable cost, lower cycle times, and increased design flexibility. But will
inkjet really prove to be a disruptive technology in these new applications? To answer
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this question we must first assess whether the products that are enabled by inkjet
manufacturing are themselves disruptive. If so, then we must consider whether they are
uniquely or best enabled by inkjet. If inkjet is the only or best way to make a disruptive
product then it would be safe to conclude that inkj et itself is a disruptive technology.
~ " , \ :'.,
2. Opportunities for Disruption
Christensen provides a useful framework to address the question as to whether the
opportunities that inkjet enables in displays and electronics are truly disruptive; that is,
will they result in new markets or new business models with high potential for growth
and success? [1] Christensen suggests that disruptive new businesses are created through
one oftwo main strategies: creation of a new market as a base for disruption or disruption
of the incumbent business model from the low end. Litmus test questions are proposed
to determine whether a new business opportunity is consistent with either of these
strategies. See Figure 1. Application of this framework suggests that both the displays
and low cost electronics products enabled by inkjet technology are likely to be disruptive
innovations, chiefly through creation of new markets.
Tests
Does the innovation target customers who haven't been able
to do it themselves due to lack of money or skill?
Is the innovation aimed at customers who will welcome a
sim Ie product?
Will the innovation help customers do more easily and
effectively what are alread to do?
Are prevailing products more than good enough?
Can you create a different business model?
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2.1 Will OLED Displays Be Disruptive?
OLED displays have the potential, in the long run, to create new markets for both
large and small displays. OLEDs should enable_.l()~y. c9~t, light-weight, wall-mountable
displays for home theatre and commercial~al;"!cet~. l'()<lay's technology for these
markets costs thousands of dollars and is out of reach for most consumers. OLED
, " r • , •• " ; ". , • '" :' , ,', .', "c.• ' " ~ '.J- ."', " •. (" " ~'i. ...
technology should enable large screens at sub-$1000 price points and help drive these
products into the mass market. .On .t~e pth~T.~l}(l Qf tqe,sy;e spectrum, OLEDs should
enable portable, roll-up displays that can provide big screetl convenience for hand-held
devices, a capability that is not available today. In both large and small screen (onnats,
OLED displays will create new markets and a~hi.eve growth by competing against non-
consumption.
Note that early applications ofOLED displays (cell phone, PDAs, laptops) do not
have this virtue and must instead compete with existing flat panel technology. In these
applications the OLED display is a higher performance, lower cost replacement for color
LCD displays. In these applications OLED displays are more a sustaining rather than a
disruptive innovation. OLED displays thus p'~s~ Christe~sen 's first test for creation of
new markets, but only in the long run (10 years or so) when it will be able to move into
new markets not accessible with LCD technology.
OLEn technology also seems to pass the second "simple product" test. OLED
displays will be bright and _easy for users to view and will enable better battery life in
portable applications. Users will welcome the ability to view their displays easily both
indoors and out angwill appreciate not have to hassle with annoying power saver features
~ , " ",
that dim or tum off the display to save batteries.
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For these same reasons, OLED displays also pass Christensen's third test for
creation of a new market as a base for disruption. There is no doubt that OLED displays
will help customers more easily and effectively do what are already trying to do. A
better, cheaper display technology does not require customers to want to do something
that is not currently a priority. On the contrary, displays are the "last mile" between
information and the brain and playa fundamental role in the way that we work and play.
OLED displays should create a better overall viewing experience in any application.
OLED displays convincingly pass theiests for a technology that will be disruptive
based on its ability to create new markets. These new markets will not materialize
immediately; OLED displays will initially be a sustaining innovation by providing better
display capability in existing products. As the technology evolves and matures it will
become disruptive by enabling new products with price points or capabilities unattainable
with other technologies.
2.2 Will Low Cost Electronics Be Disruptive?
Application of Christensen's framework to low cost electronics technologies
suggests that they too will prove to be disruptive. Low cost electronics innovations will
create new markets chiefly by making existing capabilities available at much lower price
points rather than by creating entirely new product categories. Dramatically lower price
points for products such as RFID tags, smart cards and solar cells will enable entirely
new classes of customers to take advantage of these products. These customers do not
use these products today due to their cost; products based on low cost electronics
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technologies will thus be able to compete against non-consumption, a powerful. growth
}o T .'. J. of .. :,~,":: i ' .A :·A .
driver for new businesses.
Low cost electronics technologies will also enable simple products that customers
:~ :'. ".; .~':,':'" ". ,:"':-- ",'-", .,,--:;:' ',' oIiII:;'\ ,'~"'~ '"':"" .j(-'. . ::"i,:r.::',,;, ".:-" " l". ,.{;,.,.~: :1' ~,~
will want to use. For example, R.FID'tag·s on consulrter ptoductswill simplify the
checkout task at the supermarket and will eventually simplify the everyday chores of
cooking and laundry by allowing food or clothing items to communicate with appliances.
Smart cards will simplify use of both mass transit and tollways and provide easy, yet
more secure, means for credit payment and personal identification. In other applications,
such as nonvolatile memory and solar cells, low cost electronics takes already simple
products and makes them more affordable.
Adoption of products based on low cost electronics does not require customers to
want to do something that is not currently a priority. Instead, low cost electronics
technologies will allow customers to more easily accomplish daily tasks such as shopping
and commuting. Low cost electronics will also allow consumers to make better use of
existing handheld digital products by enabling integrated solar arrays to extend battery
life and much cheaper nonvolatile memory for storing information.
Like OLED displays, low cost electronics technologies pass Christensen's three
litmus tests and thus appear likely to become a disruptive innovation. The next critical
question is whether inkjet technology is likely to be a key enabling technology for
making these new products and whether existing inkjet players should invest in evolving
today's traditional printing technology into tomorrow's electronics manufacturing
technology. Key factors are the inkjet technology fit, the strength of competing
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teclmologies and the size of the opportunity.' A framework based on thes~ fact~~s will be
introduced to compare the opportunities for inkjet in displays and low cost electronics.
3. Will Inkjet Be a K~y Enabling Technology?
Inkjet printing applied to manufacturing of displays and low cost electronics is
fundamentally a process innovation which may enable a variety of new products.
Utterback suggests that the level of process innovation increases once a dominant product
design becomes established and firms begin to compete to develop the process
teclmology that allows the product to be developed at the lowest cost. [2] According to
this framework a dominant product design emerges first followed later by development of
a process technology for producing that product most efficiently. Evidence suggests that
this pattern has been followed in several industries; new display and low cost electronics
products enabled by inkjet process technology, however, may depart from this pattern.
Here dominant product and process innovations may not emerge serially but
rather together... or not at all. The value proposition of products such as large, flexible
displays or penny RFID tags is based largely on the capabilities of the process technology
used to produce them. The emergence of such new product categories hinges on
successful process innovation to deliver key product attributes. Inkjet has strong
potential but must demonstrate that it can make the transition from a consumer printing
technology to a robust, reliable, high yield manufacturing method. This step seems a
large one but inkjet has already proven once to be a disruptive technology and should not
be counted out. In the following sections the potential of inkjet as an enabling process
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technology for OLED displays and low cost electronics is examined In tenns of
technology fit, strength of competing technologies, and size of opportunity.
3. 1 OLED Displays
In the case of OLED displays, theinkjef iechnologyfiiappears very good.·· The
task of precisely positioning circular drops'on m~dla isJwen~'~ligned with existing inkJet
capabilities. The feature sizes and required tolerances are similar to what inkjet can
already do. Cambridge Display Technology and its subsidiary Litrex have already
demonstrated that piezo-based inkjet technology is well-suited to deposition of OLED
polymer solutions. [3] Further work, however, is required to assess whether thermal
inkjet is suitable for this application.
The primary competition for OLEDdisplays based on polymer materials that can
be applied with inkjet, is OLED displays based on small molecule materials. Small
molecule OLEDs can only be applied in a vacuum system using shadow masks.
Although small molecule OLED technology is more mature than that based on jettable
polymers, the need for expensive and complex vacuum processing is a significant
disadvantage. As discussed in Chapter 3, printable OLED materials will only improve
over time and are likely to become the dominant OLED technology in the end due to their
significantly lower manufacturing cost This cost advantage becomes more important as
display sizes increase and the higher cost of small molecule OLED manufacturing is
allocated to fewer displays per unit area. Inkjet's emergence as the dominant process
technology for OLED displays may occur gradually as these displays are adopted in
larger area applications.
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It is not yet known whether printing technologies other than inkjet could be used
to manufacture displays based on polymer OLEDs. Tappan, the world's largest
manufacturer of color filters for LCD displays, has entered into a partnership with
Cambridge Display, presumably to investigate the suitability of their technology for
printing OLEDs.[4] Toppan has significant competencies in display-specific printing
and could become a major player in OLEDs. Inkjet, however, has an advantage over
Tappan's more traditional printing technology in that it is a non-contact printing method.
The importance of this advantage for manufacturing OLED displays has yet to be
determined.
Finally the size of the opportunity in OLED displays is expected to he quite large,
approaching $3B in 2008 with an annual growth rate of over 50%.[5] New products,
such as large display screens and roll-up displays, will help sustain this growth into the
next decade. Figure 2 summarizes the inkjet opportunity for OLEDs in terms of the
factors of technology fit, strength of competing technologies, and size of opportunity.
3.2 Low Cost Electronics
For low cost electronics, the technology fit for inkjet is not as good as for
displays. The types of semiconducting organic materials that can be printed with inkjet
have rather low carrier mobilities and are suitable only for undemanding product
applications such as RFID tags or solar cells. More demanding low cost electronics
applications such as smart cards and active matrix displays may not be accessible with an
inkjet manufacturing approach. The approach of jetting inorganic nanocrystals may
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provide a path towards higher performance but this approach is still very early in its
development.
Fi ure 2: Inkjet 0 ortunities
Weak
Stron
Poor
$2.658,18% CAGR
(est. 2005)
$38, 50% CAGR
(est. 2008)
Excellent
Technology Fit
Note: Low cost electronics figures include RFID market only.
Another issue with use of inkjet for printing circuits is that the feature sizes and
tolerances are beyond current inkjet capabilities. Required gate lengths of 5-10 microns
cannot be achieved with inkjet printing only and require additional measures such as
patterned hydrophobic layers to confine the ink droplets.[6] Further, printing the smooth-
edged, straight lines required for circuits can be difficult with inkjet since the jetted
material naturally tends to form a hemispherical dot on the substrate. [7]
Limited technology fit is not the only challenge for inkjet as a manufacturing
technology for low cost electronics. Competing technologies include tiny silicon chips
embedded in plastic (Alien Technologies) and polysilicon-based circuits built on plastic
(Flexics, Rolltronics). Both of these technologies leverage well-understood silicon
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technology and offer higher performance than is currently possible with inkjet printed
circuits. Other printing technologies such as embossing or stamping may also emerge as
competitors; early data shows that these approaches can pattern smaller features than
inkjet. [8]
If performance of inkjet-printed circuits cannot be improved, the market
opportunity may be limited to RFID tags and solar cells. The RFID market size was
$1.6B in 2002 and is expected to grow to reach $2.65B by 2005 (CAGR of 18.3%). [9,
10] This market size includes the RFID tags themselves as well as readers, software and
services. The market opportunity here is smaller than that for OLED displays and is
growing at a lower rate. The solar cell market is expected to reach $IB by 2005 but only
a small fraction of these will be made with printable materials. [11]
The market for low cost RF identification tags is developing quickly. Companies
are anxious to realize the significant supply chain efficiencies possible by replacing bar
codes with rf-readable labels. There is a limited window of opportunity for inkjet~printed
circuits to become established in this market. Developers of this technology must soon
demonstrate that it can deliver on the promise of ultra cheap RFID tags. Inkjet printed
circuits have lower performance than competing technologies and therefore must win on
cost. If inkjet printed circuits take too long to develop a competing technology may
become established and achieve significant scale economies to offset a more complex
manufacturing process. Early entrants should also be able to influence adoption of
standards that are favorable to their technology and perhaps disadvantageous to
competitors. A key factor will be which technology can first hit the one or two cent price
point required to make RFID tags economical in the huge consumer products markets.
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The overall opportunity for inkjet technology in low cost electronics is compared
to that in displays in Figure 2. The opportunity in OLED displays seems more
attractive. OLED display applications represent a large and growing market where
manufacturing requirements are a good fit with inkjet capabilities. Further, competing
technologies either have a significant cost disadvantage or are at a very early stage of
development. Inkjet technology thus seems more likely to become a disruptive
manufacturing technology in the OLED display industry than in the low cost electronics
industry.
Existing inkjet players should therefore invest first in trying to evolve their
technology to create a high yield, high throughput system for manufacture of polymer
OLED displays. Significant development effort will be required to tum inkjet into a
robust manufacturing technology. If these efforts meet with success, learnings can be
leveraged to extend the technology to circuit printing for low cost electronics
applications.
In either case the inkjet firms should strive to control as much of the value chain
as possible. This strategy will allow them to capture the maximum value from their
technology investment. If the inkjet firms only provide a manufacturing tool or a
component, most of the value is likely to captured by the [trms selling the end products;
inkjet firms could end up with only "cost plus" returns. If the current inkjet printing
industry is any indication, control of the supplies piece of the value chain will be
particularly important for sustained profitability_
Inkjet technology has revolutionized the printing industry and provided handsome
returns for the major players. This industry is, however, maturing and firms must
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consider how they how they can leverage their knowledge and assets to sustain future
growth. The unique aspects of inkjet technology make it well suited as a low cost
electronics manufacturing technology for displays and low cost circuits. These are
opportunities for a second inkjet revolution where this remarkable technology could
prove to be disruptive yet again.
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